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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes four generations of Maintenance Resource Management (MRM)
programs implemented by aviation maintenance organizations in the United States. Data
collected from over ten years of survey research and field observations are used for this
analysis; they are presented in a case-study format. The first three generations of MRM
programs were episodic efforts to increase safety through teamwork, focus group
discussions, and awareness courses, respectively. Now, the fourth generation programs,
characterized by a commitment to long-term communication and behavioral changes in
maintenance, are set to build on those earlier generations, toward a culture of mutual trust
between mechanics, their managers, and regulators.
Journal of Air Transportation World Wide Vol. 6, No. 2 – 2001
Dr. Taylor holds a Ph.D. in organizational psychology from University of Michigan. He has
been studying the effects of Maintenance Resource Management programs in the airline
industry since 1989. He has presented his research at several professional conferences such as
the SAE Advances in Aviation Safety conferences and the Ohio State University Aviation
Psychology Symposia. Dr. Taylor’s current research is funded through NASA Award
#NCC2-1025 to Santa Clara University, as part of a cooperative research program between
the Federal Aviation Administration Office of Aviation Medicine (FAA/AAM-240) and
NASA Ames Research Center.
Dr. Patankar holds a Ph.D. in computing technology in education from Nova Southeastern
University. He is an FAA certificated aircraft mechanic and pilot. He has been teaching in the
Aviation program at San Jose State University since 1993 and has been working with Dr.
Taylor since 1998. He has also presented his research at several professional conferences
such as the SAE Airframe/Engine Maintenance and Repair conferences and
FAA/CAA/Transport Canada joint conferences on Human Factors in Aviation Maintenance
and Inspection.
©2001, Aviation Institute, University of Nebraska at Omaha
INTRODUCTION
More than a decade ago the aviation maintenance community was
startled to discover the importance of the human factor in safety—not
merely in the design of jobs and tools, but in the aspects of interpersonal
behavior and the management of people.
Starting in 1989, airlines in the U.S. began to address open
communication to improve safety. Now, ten years after embarking on a
journey to learn from these and subsequent communication programs in
aviation maintenance we can step back and review the larger implications
of this movement. This is an overview of trends and results observed during
that time.
MRM Definition
In the past seven years Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) has
become one of the pillars in aviation human factors. The industry leaders
from a multiparty cooperative program in maintenance, which was
designed to improve communication and reduce errors (Taylor &
Christensen, 1998, pp. 48, 105–6), coined the term MRM in 1992. The
industry correctly defines MRM as “…an interactive [emphasis added]
process focused upon improving the opportunity for the maintenance
technician to perform work more safely and effectively” (ATA, 1999,
Chapter 2). In that same ATA document MRM is referred to as a training
program, but MRM is much more than training. MRM is a tool to provide
individuals and groups with the skills and processes to manage errors that
are within their control, such as communication, decision-making,
situational awareness, workload management, and team building. Part of
MRM is training, but part of it must be the application and management of
the attitude, skills, and knowledge that training and behavior can provide.
The MRM Evaluation Research Program
With the visible success of Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) in
flight operations during the decade of the 1980s, the first two airlines
intentionally improving communication in maintenance each modeled their
maintenance efforts after CRM programs within their company’s flight
operations (Taggart, 1990; Fotos, 1991). Naturally the creators of these
pioneering maintenance programs drew heavily on the available research
and hands-on experience from CRM. That included proven evaluation tools
(Gregorich, Helmreich & Wilhelm, 1990) and successful training programs
(Helmreich, Foushee, Benson & Russini, 1986) that were lightly modified
and quickly applied to the initial maintenance communication program
(Taylor, Robertson, Peck & Stelly, 1993).
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Development of attitude measurement related to MRM topics, as well as
of self-reports of subsequent behaviors—which began in 1989 (Taggart,
1990)—has continued and expanded (Taylor, 2000a). A multilevel data
base of over 30,000 mechanics, maintenance managers, and other
maintenance personnel from some dozen air carriers and repair stations is
now available at Santa Clara University and is used to compare city and
company results against standardized scores.
The evolution of locally developed maintenance communication
programs has progressed through three generations and is entering a fourth.
The four generations of MRM have been, or currently are, being measured
and evaluated. The results of these evaluations will be described below,
together with an assessment of communication improvement and safety
benefits, where available.
FOUR GENERATIONS OF MRM AND SUSTAINED SUCCESS
In the paper to follow, four generations or steps in the evolution of MRM
will be discussed. Each generation will be illustrated by at least one airline
maintenance case of an MRM-type program. With the exception of Case 1
all data reported here have been subjects of our ongoing MRM Research
Program. All cases are numbered in the order presented and case
numbering does not start over with each generation. The following
characteristics will be described for each case, where available: a) purpose
and objectives or instructional topics of the program, b) reported likelihood
of voluntary change resulting from the program, c) attitude and opinion
changes resulting from the program, d) specific intentions to change as a
result of the program, e) behavior changes resulting from the program, self-
reported or observed, f) changes in safety performance.
Generation 1: CRM-based Training in Communication Skills and
Awareness
Case 1: Change in interpersonal behavior and open communication
through teamwork.
The very first reported CRM program for maintenance in a large U.S.
airline began in November 1989.
Program purpose. The purpose of the maintenance CRM training was
similar to that of the company’s flight crew CRM training—to ensure that
teamwork and coordination are optimal and best use is made of all
resources, including people, information, and equipment (Taggart, 1990).
The training topics were interpersonal communication, assertion and
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conflict, stress, critique skills, value of briefings, situation awareness,
leadership behavior, and case studies.
The program was conducted for small groups over a several weeks and
finally included over 80 maintenance managers and supervisors. Although
it was intended that all 750 persons in maintenance management in the
company would be trained, the program was suspended and the company
was liquidated before that occurred. But as the first experience, that
program set high standards.
Likelihood of voluntary change. Participant enthusiasm for the course
was very high—over 80 percent said there would be at least a moderate
change in their on-the-job behavior.
Case 2: Assertive management communication skills and
performance.
Beginning in June 1991 a second airline company undertook a CRM in
maintenance training course for communication and safety (Fotos, 1991).
This training continued for over two years. This early and highly successful
version of MRM emphasized open and assertive communication, both in
theory and in practice, as well as an awareness of others. The detailed
results of the evaluation study having been published in previous papers
will not be repeated here, and bibliographic citations will direct the reader
to the appropriate references
Program purpose. The purpose of the course was stated as “equipping
participants with the skill to use all resources to improve safety and
efficiency” (Taylor & Robertson, 1995). Specific objectives, or topics
covered were a) diagnose organizational norms and their effect on safety, b)
promote assertive behavior, c) understand individual leadership styles, d)
understand and manage stress, e) enhance rational problem solving and
decision making skills, f) enhance interpersonal skills.
Time was taken during the two-day training program to role-play giving
and receiving assertive communication (Stelly & Taylor, 1992), and
participants praised that activity highly (Taylor & Robertson, 1995). All
maintenance management and professional engineering staff (N > 2,000)
attended the program.
Likelihood of voluntary change. Enthusiasm for this program actually
exceeded the high marks earlier reported by Taggart (1990)—at the end of
the two-day training nearly 90 percent of the participants said there would
be at least a moderate change in their on-the-job behavior (Taylor &
Robertson, 1995).
This program was brought to completion by August 1993 (a 26-month
period).
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Attitude changes. The post-training attitudes showed improvement in
feelings toward participation, stress management, and communication; but
no immediate improvement in attitudes about assertiveness—those would
come later. These maintenance managers also initially indicated intentions
to change in rather passive ways (e.g., “to be a better listener”) than to
immediately practice assertiveness and “speaking-up.” Two months
following training however, feelings about assertiveness increased for
many of these managers—and their intentions for further steps were more
active as well (Robertson, Taylor, Stelly, & Wagner, 1995; Taylor &
Robertson, 1995; Taylor & Christensen, 1998).
Performance changes. For 24 months following the onset of the
program, the incidence of lost time injuries and aircraft ground damage
decreased (Taylor & Robertson, 1995), and the former was highly
correlated with the improvement in attitudes toward assertiveness just
noted (Taylor, 1995).
In August 1993, upon completing the training for maintenance
management and achieving these improvements in attitude and safety,
plans were laid to move the program into the ranks of mechanics. Other
concerns interfered with the continued progress of MRM and eventually
only a small proportion of mechanics were trained. By that time top
management’s concerns had turned from communication and safety to
station closures and cost cutting, and the excellent results of their MRM
program began to reverse (Taylor & Christensen, 1998, pp. 128–129).
Case 3: Assertive AMT communication skills and performance.
Program purpose. Before the above reversal began in earnest, the
MRM program was modified for mechanics by changing only the case
studies to maintenance-caused accidents or incidents and leaving the
purpose, the timing, the major topics and the exercises in place.
Beginning in September 1993 about 450 participants (one-third new
supervisors and two-thirds mechanics) from 28 work units attended MRM
training. By June 1994, after a period of just over six months, the pace for
this training had declined to a trickle—mainly as a result of top
management succession and changes in maintenance priorities.
Little, if any, of this type of intervention with mechanics (hereafter
called Aviation Maintenance Technicians, or AMTs) and other operational
hourly personnel had been previously attempted in North America.
Common wisdom held that communication training for AMTs and other
hourly workers was an unnecessary expense in a period of prolonged
financial hardship—and, in any event, that this kind of interpersonal
training would probably benefit management participants more than hourly
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employees. Recurrent training for AMTs was typically limited to passively
viewing videos produced by the company’s Technical Training
Department, or to on the job training (OJT) by lead or senior mechanics.
Given those assumptions, the results of this MRM training were surprising.
Likelihood of voluntary changes. Like the management results in
Cases 1 and 2, the 300 AMTs show clear enthusiasm. Eighty percent (80
percent) of them reported that they expected moderate to large changes in
their behavior as a result of the MRM training (Taylor, Robertson & Choi,
1997).
Specific intentions to change. These AMTs were also asked to write
their responses to the question: “How will you use this training on your
job?” Content coding of those answers resulted in the bulk of the responses
divided into five categories: “dealing better with others,” “being more
assertive,” “being more aware of other’s behavior,” “being a better listener,”
and “fighting complacency/being more careful at work.” The first two
categories were classified as active communication intentions—to be
carried out with coworkers, while the latter three were considered to be
more passive coping behaviors—and could be done alone. Forty percent of
the AMTs responses were coded in the first two (active) categories while
some 45 percent were coded in one of the three passive categories. This
proportional division would prove to be very high for active
communication. The AMTs’ positive experience with MRM training leads
to enhanced performance as well.
Attitude changes. AMT attitudes immediately following the training
reveal a marked change toward AMTs assuming command responsibility
and an increased appreciation of stress management. In the main these
results obtained for technicians parallel those reported for maintenance
managers and support professionals (Taylor, 1995; Taylor & Robertson,
1995).
Performance changes. In part the AMT data proved even stronger than
the management results in showing positive effects of collaboration and
human factors training (Taylor et al., 1997). In particular, stronger
relationships between AMT post-training attitudes and safety performance
in the six months immediately following training is evidence of the fact that
because AMTs are the persons directly effecting performance, their
attitudes should most quickly relate to that performance. That brief
program proved to be a successful venture into MRM training for AMTs. It
is unfortunate that it was halted so soon after it began.
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Generation 2: Directly Address Communicating and Understanding
Maintenance Errors
Case 4: Using focus groups to reduce errors in aviation maintenance.
During 1992-1994, the Quality Assurance (QA) department in another
large airline (employing nearly 2,000 AMTs and foremen in 37 line
stations) began an informal cooperative arrangement with the trade union
(IAM) representing its AMTs, and with its FAA Flight Standards District
Office (FSDO).
Program purpose. This cooperation was intended to reduce a high
incidence of errors in maintenance documentation by opening
communication channels among the company, the union and the regulator.
The program lasted two years and covered three phases. It began with 30
group interviews, involving over 150 AMTs and foremen in eight line
maintenance stations. These interviews focused on maintenance paperwork
errors, their causes, and their solutions. In the second phase of the project,
the results from the interviews in the first phase were fed back to all parties
and management took action based on the proposed solutions. In some
cases the solutions/changes affected all of the company’s line stations, and
in other cases the changes were tried in one station and reviewed against
suitable comparisons (a natural experiment). In the third phase, the changes
were given time (up to 28 months after the onset of the MRM program) to
affect measured error rates in maintenance documentation, and the results
were distributed to all parties.
One of the solutions recommended and implemented involved passive
engagement (e.g., formal training in paperwork for all line AMTs). The
effects of that paperwork training on error rates were immediate, but short-
lived (Taylor, 1995, Taylor & Christensen, 1998).
Two other solutions required active involvement and communication
(e.g., pre-shift team meetings in order to open communication channels,
and AMT group participation in re-designing the aircraft logbook form).
The two active communication solutions were implemented in one line
maintenance station—one that had previously participated in the focus
group interviews. Four months after their initial MRM focus group session,
the station’s employees were invited to join in a new activity. First, that
station’s foremen received training in communication and leading
meetings, and they began holding daily start-of-shift crew briefings.
Second, the AMTs had the opportunity to attend occasional, informal
sessions to discuss ways to improve the aircraft logbook document layout.
The logbook improvement sessions were led by a manager from the
company’s Quality Assurance department. The total paperwork error rates
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for this experimental station were matched with those of another line
station of similar size and location that did not participate in the focus
group interviews or in the crew meetings or logbook improvement effort.
The main differences between the experimental and comparison stations
were their reputations for morale and their relations with flight crews.
During 1992-93, the morale and service reputation of the experimental
station was considered poor, while the comparison station enjoyed a better
image.
Performance changes. In May 1993, two months after the focus group
interviews in the experimental station (but before any feedback to that
station), its logbook errors were higher than either the comparison station
or all stations combined. When the experiment began in August 1993, the
experimental station subsequently experienced rapid and visible
improvements attributed to the enhanced communication while the
comparison station’s error performance more closely matched the system
overall (Taylor, 1995). For March through August 1994, nine to twelve
months following the onset of the study, the experimental station continued
to show a lower error rate than the comparison station and/or all stations
combined. Thus, after the MRM interventions began there, the
experimental station displayed a lower logbook error rate in both
comparisons for every subsequent month available thereafter (Taylor,
1994; 1995).
By 1995, the experiment concluded that—not by plan, but by lack of
momentum—the local managers and supervisors who supported the shift
briefings and AMT participation in decision making left the station and/or
the company. Their successors were encouraged to support another (and
department-wide) program in non-safety related employee communication
and participation.
The QA, IAM, and FSDO partners to this company’s cooperative MRM
relationship continued their efforts to reduce errors. In 1993, these three
partners created an on-going human-centered error investigation process
which was designed to analyze specific cases of maintainer mistakes using
a participative process and to apply what is learned to system-wide
solutions (Marx, 1998).
In general, such second-generation programs, although participative, are
reactive to prior problems. Thus they are in part focused on the past.
Generation 3: AMT Maintenance Training for Individual Awareness
and Readiness
In 1994 the curriculum for a different kind of maintenance training
program was developed and distributed through Transport Canada. The
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program, called Human Performance in Maintenance (HPIM) is based on a
two-day training course designed specifically for AMTs. It soon became
widely known because of the maintenance-oriented nature of its training
materials and its ready availability. Among HPIM’s most popular
innovations is a set of safety posters—the Dirty Dozen posters—one for
each of twelve major causes of maintenance errors (Taylor & Christensen,
1998, pp. 145–6). As evidence for the strength of HPIM influence, all
reported MRM programs implemented in North America since 1994 have
included the Dirty Dozen as a core set of concepts. The purpose of HPIM
training as described in the prototype participants’ workbook is “to create
an awareness of the human aspect of aircraft maintenance and develop
safeguards to lessen the ‘human cause’ factors in maintenance” (Transport
Canada, 1996, p. 7).
In several ways HPIM has had a direct impact on the development of the
third generation of MRM programs. First is the emphasis on awareness.
The HPIM purpose differs from the purpose of the CRM-based
maintenance training in Cases 1 through 3 above. HPIM focuses on
awareness and coping mechanisms or safeguards, while the MRM of Cases
1 through 3 focuses on skills such as communication and assertiveness.
Second is the emphasis on the individual. The objectives of the initial 1994
HPIM course emphasizes three of the Dirty Dozen—lack of
communication, stress, and fatigue—two of which are primarily personal
issues that can be best managed by the individual. Third is the emphasis on
internal and passive change rather than interpersonal and active change. In
HPIM both its curriculum and workbook illustrate this. The workbook
includes a section on communication that emphasizes listening (passive
rather than active communication) as a major technique. This trend that
maintenance was taking on an awareness training orientation has been
noted by others (Kanki, Walter & Dulchinos, 1997).
Although the several cases of third generation MRM described below
differ in significant detail from one another they all share a training purpose
focused on awareness as well as resulting overwhelmingly in intended and
reported changes which are passive, individual, coping adaptations rather
than active changes in communication.
Case 5: AMT awareness leads to improved performance.
In 1996 a large airline undertook to provide MRM training for all of its
AMTs.
Program purpose. The purpose of the program, stated in participant’s
workbook is to create an awareness of the impact of human performance on
maintenance-related errors and personal safety. The learning objectives for
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the course were as follows: a) relate how AMT characteristics and personal
behavior can impact the maintenance process, b) identify 12 performance
factors (dirty dozen) and their role in the chain of events leading to
maintenance-related errors, c) develop personal techniques to minimize
risk and maximize performance, and d) give and receive feedback with
coworkers related to personal safety.
The company trained over six thousand employees during a two and
one-half year period. It addressed its MRM training exclusively to AMTs
(supervisors and managers account for less than 1 percent of the total
trained in that company). The AMT union and the company’s management
cooperated to initiate the training. Training materials were adapted from
the HPIM package and the company standardized them for its own
use—including the use of local case illustrations. In addition to the three of
the dirty dozen emphasized in the HPIM syllabus a fourth dirty item,
complacency, was added to the core curriculum. Training then continued at
the local level with facilitators coming from the ranks of both AMTs and
their first-line supervisors. This group of facilitators represented excellent
use of local operations experience and leadership abilities. The training was
coordinated and supported by the company’s training and education
department.
Likelihood of voluntary change. Enthusiasm was positive immediately
following the training even if some participants hedged a little on their
interpretation of substantial change. Over sixty percent of the participants
said there would be a moderate or large change in their on-the-job behavior
(Taylor & Christensen, 1998). Although a clear majority believes that the
training will affect their actual behavior, this level of enthusiasm does not
approach the high ratings—between 80 percent and 90 percent—reported
for the earlier three MRM cases.
Specific intentions to change. These AMTs also responded to the
question: “How will you use this training on your job?” Content coding of
those answers resulted in the bulk of the responses divided into several
categories including “interacting with others,” “being more assertive,”
“being more aware of other’s behavior,” “being a better listener,” and
“fighting complacency/being more careful at work.” The first two
categories—active communication intentions—can be compared with the
more passive coping behaviors that can be done alone. As shown in Table 1
below, 27 percent of the AMTs’responses were coded in the active category
while nearly 46 percent were coded in the passive category. This result is
substantially lower for active communication than the AMT sample
described in case 3. This tendency toward passive coping behaviors is
consistent with the purpose and objectives of the case 5 program.
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Attitude changes. Statistically significant improvements were found in
attitudes about sharing responsibility, communication, and stress
management immediately following the training sessions. The change in
the value of stress management was particularly striking. Furthermore,
those same three attitudes remained stable for months after the training.
Attitudes toward assertiveness did not improve as a result of the training
(Taylor & Christensen, 1998).
Performance changes. The AMTs’ positive attitudes following MRM
training leads to enhanced performance as well. In particular, the marked
increase in appreciation of stress management two months after training
showed the strongest correlations with low rates of injury and aircraft
damage (Taylor, 1998a). Two years later, we found that line maintenance
stress management six months after training also shows correlations with
the six-month periods of improved ground damage rates—mainly
coincident with the two month survey (Taylor, 2000b). Stress management
is primarily a passive coping activity and its improvement following the
training and its relationship to safety performance improvements is entirely
consistent with this company’s MRM purpose.
By 1999, the higher the line mechanics evaluated goal sharing and safety
practice in their units six months after their MRM training, the lower the
incidence of LTI in those units both before and after the survey (Taylor,
2000b). These results emphasize that if line maintenance share goals and
experience a responsive safety practice, their injury rates will be lower.
For base maintenance in Case 5, correlations are found between six-
month measurement of communication & coordination attitudes and
aircraft ground damage. This pattern is quite strong and regular—it
suggests that the more value that is placed on meetings and briefings and
other communication six months after training, the better is ground damage
performance in the following year (Taylor, 2000b).
Figures 1, 2, and 3 below show performance data for the expanded five-
year period 1995–1999. All figures show linear trend lines (obtained using
the Least Squares method) for the before, during and after-training periods
superimposed over the actual monthly data points.
Figures 1 and 2 show the trends before, during, and after MRM training
for occupational injuries and aircraft ground damage for line maintenance
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Table 1. Case 5 Post-training Behavior Intentions (n=4,613)
Total Passive Intentions 45.9%
Total Active Intentions 27.3%
Other 21.5%
No Change Intended 5.3%
100.0%
performance. Figure 3 shows similar trends for occupational injuries for
base maintenance.
It is clear from the trends in Figures 1 and 2 that a dramatic improvement
took place for the line stations taken together. Furthermore, this
improvement directly after the onset of the MRM program and its rate of
change continues in the two years following the completion of the MRM
training. This strongly suggests that the awareness program works, through
its effect on stress management and situation awareness—at least in this
company’s line maintenance organization.
For the Base Maintenance organization the effect is also encouraging.
Figure 3 shows that the trend for lost time injuries remains low during the
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Figure 1. Five Years of Line Maintenance Aircraft Ground Damage (n = 42 stations)
Figure 2. Five Years of Line Maintenance Lost Time Injuries (n = 42 stations)
period of MRM training and that it rises and falls only gradually in the 15
months after the training was concluded. However, because of the sharply
downward trend before the training began we must question whether the
lower rates during training and after are a continuation of some previous
program to lessen injuries in the hangars or they are the result of the MRM
training.
An unplanned liability of the individual change model. It is
ironic—given the apparent success of this MRM program as expressed in
long-term safety outcomes—that AMTs’ enthusiasm for the program
turned from positive to negative. Earlier reports examining the attitudes and
opinions of line maintenance employees in the months following their
MRM training have described the apparent frustration and anger these
individuals voiced (Taylor, 1998a). They expected more support by their
managers and co-workers in fulfilling the promise of the MRM program to
improve communication and collaboration (Taylor, 1998b). Subsequent
interviews and observations in the company’s repair hangars confirm this
backlash exists in heavy maintenance as well. AMTs and inspectors
reported discouragement waiting for some management safety initiative
that was based on the content of the MRM course.
This company’s individual-based awareness training, with its emphasis
on building individual’s coping skills, does not give AMTs subsequent
information about whether or how much the MRM program is working, or
whether other people value the lessons of the training like they themselves
do. Months after the training many AMTs reported still being careful,
fighting complacency, and managing their own stress levels. But many also
did not think the MRM program would be very useful in the future (Taylor
& Christensen, 1998). Many said they did not know or could not tell if
others were using the lessons learned from the training—they rarely talked
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Figure 3. Five Years of Heavy Maintenance Lost Time Injuries (n = 40 units)
about MRM informally and were never encouraged to do so by their
leaders.
Case 6: Distributing Third generation MRM training.
Another company’s adaptations to the MRM third generation have been
to train all maintenance personnel, and to divide two days of training over
several months. That company created its own MRM training after
reviewing the HPIM training model. The AMTs’ union and the company’s
management cooperated to initiate and design the training. Training
materials were inspired by the HPIM package, but the most of the exercises
and cases were created specifically for this application.
Program purpose. To provide participants with specific human factors
principles and techniques to help them work more safely. The definition of
MRM, stated in the participant’s workbook, “…is the process where we
work together, using available resources, to reduce errors and to promote
safety.” The statement goes on to say, “MRM addresses human factor errors
and problem resolution through open and honest communication between
all maintenance operations personnel, and with the FAA.”
The training topics for the first day are: a) identify human factors
elements, b) recognize the dirty dozen error causes, c) identify the chain of
events in accidents, d) effective written communication, e) identify norms,
f) establish safety nets, and g) recognize safety mechanisms.
Although the MRM definition quoted above is more active and
interpersonal than is typical for the HPIM (third generation) model, the
supporting topics are largely awareness or conceptual issues—with written
communication as the active skill exception.
At the beginning of the second training day (Phase 2) the definition of
MRM is reiterated. The training topics in the participants’workbook for the
second day are as follows: a) recognize the nature of errors and how the
affect participants; b) focus on how to manage errors, where dirty dozen
topics: of lack of assertiveness and lack of awareness are emphasized;
c)introduce tools to use in error reduction with an emphasis on situation
awareness.
Likewise these topic labels for phase 2 training seem more conceptual
than behavioral. The module on lack of assertiveness is, however, focusing
on active communication. On the other hand, the main tool in the final
phase 2 topic list, “situation awareness,” is an individual, passive
mechanism. This MRM program appears to be bridging between the third
generation model of individual AMTs coping with safety hazards and
issues and the interpersonal communication techniques of the original
MRM maintenance safety training. By design, phase 2 (the second day of
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training) is conducted about two months after the first one.
The course is designed for all maintenance employees and each session
is expected to include management and hourly employees from a variety of
functions within maintenance. Initially, the training took place in a large
line station and both phases 1 and 2 were completed there before the
program was moved to two cities containing both base and line
maintenance stations. Eventually all 8,000 maintenance employees
throughout the system are expected to attend the training.
Phase 1 training for the first city (line maintenance station “A” with
some 500 maintenance employees) was finished in July 1998. Phase 2 was
completed during August and September 1998. The second city (“B”) to
begin the MRM training included both a large line station and a major
heavy maintenance base. City B began phase 1 training in September 1998
and completed it with about 1,000 maintenance personnel in April 1999.
Phase 2 began in city B during June 1999 and was about 50 percent
completed by December 1999. A third city (also both a large line station
and a major heavy maintenance base) began phase 1 training in July 1999
and, with over 900 employees attending, had not yet been completed by
December 1999. Results from cities A and B will be used below to illustrate
the effects of distributed training and the modified course purpose and
topics.
Likelihood of voluntary change. Enthusiasm for city A is moderate
when compared with past MRM experience described for the cases above.
Slightly over 60 percent of the participants following phase 1 said there
would be a moderate to large change in their on-the-job behavior.
Following phase 2, 65 percent city A participants said there would be at
least a moderate change in their at-work activities. This modest increase in
encouraging, but statistical tests of this result, or the change between the
associated phase 1 and 2 mean scores, do not show significant differences.
For city B the enthusiasm following phase 1 is also moderate with some 69
percent saying there would at least a moderate change in their behavior.
Following phase 2, 85 percent in city B say they expect moderate to large
change in their at-work activities. With only half of the phase 1 respondents
having attended phase 2 training these results are incomplete, but they are
certainly promising.
Attitude changes. Figure 4 shows the mean scores for attitudes and
opinions for city A, the first station to complete the two phase MRM
program. Immediately following the phase 1 training, participants’
attitudes reveal significant improvement in attitudes toward
communication, stress management and assertiveness. Following phase 2
training all three attitudes increased again significantly. Although attitudes
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toward sharing command responsibility increase slightly over this time, the
differences are not statistically significant.
Opinion changes. Figure 4 also shows city A participants’ evaluation of
their station’s goal setting and sharing remained unchanged between
phases 1 and 2. However their evaluations of the station’s safety climate
decreased significantly (F = 8.29, p < 001) between phases 1 and 2. Field
observation at city A some 60 days after phase 1 training and again four
months after phase 2 confirm these survey results. AMTs, leads, and
foremen reported that safety standards and program seemed to be
deteriorating. Apart from their own individual care and awareness, they
said, little was being done to support maintenance safety in the station.
Specific intentions to change. The question, “How will you use this
training on the job?,” was included in the surveys that followed both phase
1 and phase 2 training. City A participants’ answers to that question were
coded for intentions to begin active communication with management and
coworkers, as well as for intentions to apply more individual, passive,
coping behaviors. If respondents said they were not intending to change at
all, that was coded separately. Those answers that did not fit any of the
categories were coded other. Answers to the same question from city B’s
MRM participants were similarly coded and can be compared with city A’s
results.
Self-reported changes between MRM phases 1 and 2. The post-phase
2 survey asked the question, “How have you used the MRM training on
your job?” The answers received were coded the same as those for the
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Figure 4. Distributed MRM Sessions: Attitude & Opinion Changes
question of intention. Thus both intention to change and the subsequent
changes can be compared over time. These data are presently available for
city A in its entirety as well as for first half of the city B participants who
have completed phase 2 training.
Figure 5 presents the expected behaviors at the end of both phase 1 and 2
training. The figure also shows the actual behaviors reported by
participants at the time of the phase 2 training. Although 11 percent in city
A said they intended to communicate actively following phase 1, only eight
percent reported having done so when they returned for phase 2 training.
Fifteen percent expected to actively communicate after attending the
second day. For city B a larger percentage (nearly twice as large as city A)
reported having been more active communicators when they returned for
phase 2, and that proportion again, further expected to actively
communicate with others about safety. These results, even though they shift
slightly more toward active intentions following phase 2 training they do
not favorably compare with the proportions of active to passive intentions
found in cases in the first generation of MRM training. This ratio in figure 5
(generally about 15 percent active to over 45 percent passive) is much less
than the 40 percent active to 45 percent passive intentions in the earlier
programs (Taylor & Robertson, 1995; Taylor, et al., 1997).
Performance changes. Four years (1996-99) of aircraft damage
incidents charged to city A maintenance are compared with all line stations
in Figure 6. The overall pattern of ground damage incidents for all (n = 45)
line stations in the system remains steady with a flat trend line during this
four year period. The results for city A, however, show an increasing
incident rate before the MRM training began. That trend reverses following
the phase 1 training and it continues downward for 16 months after the
Taylor and Patankar 19
Figure 5. Planning for and Using the MRM Training
second training phase concluded. The initial ground damage results for city
B are not portrayed here, but they track a similar pattern of increasing
incidents before the onset of the MRM training followed by a marked
decline after the program begins.
This improvement in safety results is further evidence for the effect that
MRM awareness instruction can have on maintenance performance. This,
coupled with sustained enthusiasm following more than a year from the
completion of the training, suggests that the distributed, two-phase training
program may avoid some of the frustration and anger caused by a perceived
lack of support by their managers and co-workers to improve the safety
climate (Taylor, 1998b).
This two-phase MRM training appears to provide several additional
advantages over the one-shot training model. First, it provides the
opportunity for program facilitators to follow-up and elaborate the lessons
from the first session. For example, some changes to the phase 2 curriculum
for city B were made after the program had been used at city A.
Second, the subsequent session begins to demonstrate management’s
commitment to an ongoing MRM program. Unlike the experience in Case 5
above, where interest in changing behavior declines steadily in the months
after training, some enthusiasm for the program in the present case
continues months after the initial training.
Third, it should begin to satisfy those participants who want recurrent
training on these topics. Typically some 10 to 12 percent of participants in
previous MRM programs have said that recurrent MRM training would
make an improvement to the one-shot model. In this case however the
expectation for further MRM training may be heightened with a two-phase
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Figure 6. Ground Damage & 2-Phase MRM Training
program. In this regard nearly 20 percent of the participants’ following the
Case 6 two-phased training said even further recurrent training would
improve this model. Another 20 percent are eager to see more management
and employees from other maintenance groups experience this MRM
training.
Despite the successes reported for Cases 5 and 6, together with the
added advantages of the distributed awareness training, they remain
programs to influence the values and awareness of individuals. These
programs do not create the structure and the process for improving safety at
a systemic, interpersonal level. They also do not have clear safety goals,
rapid feedback of results, or appropriate reinforcement for those who are
behaving more safely. Without these systemic, organizational features,
MRM programs like those illustrated in Cases 5 and 6 seem destined to
suffer the irony of increased long term improvement coupled with
participants’ ignorance about that gain and greater pessimism about the
quality of maintenance safety programs. The sheer professionalism of the
AMTs themselves makes these present programs work. AMTs are
reminded of the dangers of the dirty dozen causes of errors and accidents
and they respond appropriately—on their own and apparently for a period
of months, or years not weeks.
Generation 4: Integrated, behavior-based MRM programs
The fourth generation MRM programs are using the knowledge gained
from the experience of the past three generations and from recent
innovative processes to standardize communication and tactical decision
making. For the first time, these programs are being designed and
implemented from a systemic perspective. Data from the past three
generations of MRM programs shows that different MRM programs
usually achieve different results. Therefore, airlines are now adding a skills
training module to their classroom instruction and making it a true training
program that is more likely to result in more open communication
(Patankar & Taylor, 2000). These airlines are also aware of the limited
interpersonal trust that impede self-disclosure, and they are striving to
incorporate a maintenance error investigation (MEI) module in their
training, and in their larger program, so that the participants understand the
goal and the procedure of such investigation. In the skills training module,
the airlines are beginning to train their maintenance personnel to use
simple, standard processes to detect and resolve differences in information
through third-party validation. The airlines are now better informed about
the capabilities and limitations of MRM programs, and they are embarking
Taylor and Patankar 21
on a new result-oriented approach to safety through strategic, system-wide,
changes.
Understanding the human factor in unanticipated events. Real time
knowledge of what human factors lie behind classes of maintenance errors
is important to obtain, and central to the long-range and comprehensive
success of MRM. Processes for a human-centered maintenance error
investigation (MEI) are becoming objects of serious interests in aviation
maintenance organizations (Allen & Marx, 1994; FAA, 1999). However,
full-blown maintenance experience with such programs is limited. A recent
expert assessment of MEI in the U.S. shows that there has been little
commitment yet by either the air carriers or repair stations to see such error
investigation and analysis become a new way of doing business (Marx,
1998).
Trust within the maintenance system. Informal reports from users
suggest that AMTs limited trust of the MEI process creates an obstacle to
its widespread diffusion. Why should an AMT cooperate with management
in investigating his/her own mistakes? Unless a strong culture for open
communication and assertiveness already exists in their organization,
relatively few AMTs will voluntarily or willingly disclose what they
believe to be the real story. AMTs’ individualism (Taylor, 1999; Taylor &
Patankar, 1999) and self-reliance (Taylor & Christensen, 1998) can limit
their trust in others.
In order to develop a strong safety culture a maintenance organization
must first recognize its own organizational and occupational culture, and it
must appreciate the interplay between these two with the effects of national
origins and cultures of its individual members (Taylor, 1999; Patankar,
1999).
Now, at the beginning of the 21st Century, MRM is being seen as more
than mere awareness training, or coping skills for individual AMTs—it is
the conscious process of increasing trust among maintainers, their
managers, and their regulators that enable them to learn from present
behaviors in order to improve future quality and efficiency. MRM is now a
process of cultural change.
Direct focus on behavior change. The focus of contemporary MRM
programs is now moving toward active error reduction through structured
communication. Patankar and Taylor (1999) describe a case from the
corporate aviation environment that uses a behavior-change first approach
instead of the prevalent attitude-change first of MRM. In the earlier MRM
generations 1 and 3, companies simply provided classroom instruction and
hoped that the desired change in attitudes and behavior would take place
automatically. This strategy focused on changing the participants’ attitude
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toward safety through education and persuasion, and sometimes skill
training. Its developers hoped that participants’ behavior would change as a
consequence of the classroom experience alone. Unfortunately, the
evaluations of such training programs for improving communication
revealed that the subsequent behavior change is limited—either in scope or
duration.
At the same time there were companies that began to provide a simple
structure and process for communication among all departments associated
with aviation operations: flight crew, maintenance, and administration.
These companies assumed that if they provided a simple, consistent
communication and decision making process, and the outcome of this
process was promptly acted upon and continuously supported, their
employees would continue to use it and could eventually change their
attitudes. The immediate interest of these companies was in changing their
employees’ work-related communication behavior, they did not use the
better known attitude change approach taken in MRM generations 1 and 2.
The Structured Communication Process. Basically, there are two
aspects to achieving new communication behavior: first, a structure which
requires connected parties to communicate, and second, a process that is
followed consistently—regardless of the outcome.
Structure: An example of structure might be an organization policy for
line maintenance which requires that for each flight an AMT act (either by
direction or discretion) as its liaison AMT. This person is expected to meet
with the flight crew and discuss the maintenance issues with them. The
pilots are expected to remain after arrival to discuss maintenance
discrepancies with the AMT. During such discussions, both the flight crew
and the maintenance AMT(s) are required to follow the pre-agreed
communication process described below. Another example of structure is a
policy requiring that maintenance shift turnovers take place face-to-face;
and that among other standing agenda items is the expectation that AMTs
leads and foremen briefly review the outgoing shift’s use of the pre-agreed
decision making process.
Process: A process for enhanced aviation communication has been
observed and documented (Lynch, 1996; Patankar & Taylor, 1999). Its
originators (CMR, Inc. of XX, VT) have titled it the Concept Alignment
Process (CAP). According to this process, a concept is an idea or a piece of
information presented by an observer of, or a party to, a technical decision.
All members are expected to present their concepts. If the members present
differing concepts, they must validate their concepts from a third party
source such as a flight manual, air traffic controller, maintenance manual,
or company policy. If only one concept can be validated, it is executed; if
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none of the concepts can be validated, the most conservative concept is
executed; and if multiple concepts can be validated, the senior ranking
person has the authority to choose any one of the valid concepts.
Additionally, when multiple concepts are stated, whether valid or not, the
members are required to investigate the reasons for the existence of
multiple concepts. Such an investigation is aimed at providing systemic
feedback to minimize the occurrence of multiple concepts, at least not the
non-validated ones.
The Concept Alignment Process addresses the following causes of
human error accidents: (Lynch, 1996) nonadherence to procedure,
incorrect tactical decisions, inattention or complacency, and failure to
challenge another member’s error.
The CAP provides objective procedures, thus making the use of the
process observable to all. It provides team members with decision-making
and conflict resolution methodology. It reduces chances of acting on
incorrect concepts for forcing collaborative task completion and decision
making. It reduces interpersonal conflict and defensiveness through the
understanding that what is challenged is the concept and not the individual.
All of these benefits have been observed in the use of the CAP in the
maintenance environment. The following description of Case 7 highlights
those benefits.
Case 7: The Concept Alignment Process to facilitate crew
communication and consistent decision making among all members
of a corporate aviation department.
The aviation department of a large U.S. corporation trained all of its
flight crew and maintenance members to use this system. The management
used it as well.
Purpose. The CAP, a communication and decision-making protocol,
was implemented to enhance systemic safety through early identification
and management of risk. With this approach, management intended to
impact behavior and did not aim to directly or immediately change attitudes
toward interpersonal relations at work.
The management required that all aviation employees use the CAP
actively and held them accountable for it. Therefore, the use of the system
was not voluntary. This is consistent with the behavior-first strategy
discussed earlier. However, Patankar and Taylor (1999) observed that once
the employees (both flight and maintenance crew members) experienced
successful implementation of the process and consistent support from the
management, even if it meant making policy changes or confronting the
local FAA, their belief in the process grew and their attitude toward safety
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and toward the use of this process changed over time. Most maintenance
employees agreed that it took some time for them to really understand the
process and be able to apply it consistently. The flight operations personnel
had been using, the CAP for almost three years before the maintenance
manager began learning the process. He customized the original flight-
oriented program to a maintenance-oriented program and called it Error
Reduction & Decision Making Process.
Likelihood of voluntary change. A year after the Maintenance Error
Reduction Program began AMTs were surveyed for their attitudes and
opinions about it. Only 40 percent of the AMTs said the program had at
least moderate effect on their behavior, but nearly three-quarters of them
reported that the program had been useful to others. Regardless of how they
may discount the program’s effects on themselves, these AMTs could see
the effects on the others around them.
Attitude and opinions. Compared with our standard dataset (Taylor,
2000b), the survey for this aviation department showed favorable attitudes
toward sharing command responsibility, and for assertiveness. These
people do value speaking up and making decisions. Their attitudes toward
communication however, were substantially below our standard
benchmark. That is, they appear not to value or enjoy communication for its
own sake. Their assessment of goal setting and sharing is at the benchmark
norm, while their evaluation of the department’s safety climate was higher
than the norm.
Behavior changes. The behavior changes were almost immediate.
Because the change was mandatory and the employees were evaluated
based on their ability to use the process, everyone tried to use it. Although
some did not believe in it as much as others did, they all used it. There were
a few product champions who consistently used the CAP process and more
assertively addressed the concepts of others. Self-reports of how the
process was used and stated intentions to continue using it are encouraging.
Two-thirds of the AMTs reported that the program caused them to
communicate actively while only one member described behaving
passively as a result of the CAP process. Reported intentions to further use
the process were weighted toward active communication vs. passive
reaction in a ratio of two to one.
As the AMTs observed that the management supported the process,
regardless of the outcome, they started to trust this new communication
protocol and continued to use it. There were times when the flight crew and
the maintenance crew had disagreements and each party was able to
validate its concept (Patankar & Taylor, 1999). Under such circumstances,
the department manager was able to step-in, validate the application of the
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process, and determine an outcome that was consistent with the CAP
protocol. Consequently, all parties emerged trusting the process more.
Performance changes. As a result of the CAP process, the maintenance
personnel, the flight crew, and the management were more actively
engaging external vendors, aircraft manufacturers, and their local FAA for
more accurate and acceptable solutions to problems. Additionally, the
maintenance manager was able to follow-up on several information
discrepancies, determine their root cause, and make the necessary
structural or procedural changes so that the same discrepancy would not
arise in the future.
Processes such as the CAP focus on behavioral outcomes rather than
attitudinal change by providing a simple structure and process for
communication among all parties involved in aircraft operations. The
consistent use of this pre-agreed process, regardless of the outcome, in
genuine pursuit of systemic improvements toward safety builds trust
among all parties. Through consistent use of this process, the corporate
aviation department was able to raise the performance standards at an
individual as well as organizational level. Such an approach shows strong
potential for long-term changes in the aviation safety culture.
Organizational safety culture and management support. Assuming
that organizational culture has the potential for the greatest impact on
safety, Helmreich and Merritt (1998) present strategies to unify and
strengthen the organizational culture and aim to introduce safety as a
shared value. Management’s commitment, Helmreich and Merritt suggest,
is prerequisite to successful implementation of new process or protocol
because although an organizational culture is shaped by all of the
employees, an organizational change is defined by the upper management.
“Senior Management is a part of, not apart from, the culture; that is, it does
not look down upon the organization and direct it by edict, rather it
influences the culture as a participating element within the culture”
(p. 124). The change has to be top-down, through concrete and consistent
examples.
In Case 7, the CAP communication protocol worked as an outstanding
strategy to unify and strengthen the organizational culture because the top
management agreed to manage risk through team decision making. On the
flight side, the pilots were required to conduct preflight briefings and post-
flight debriefings for every flight. Similarly, in the maintenance
department, the AMTs were required to conduct regular briefings with the
flight crew and follow the approved protocol. In addition maintenance
personnel agreed to discuss the recent use of the CAP during their daily
shift turnover meetings. The management fully supported these briefings
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and agreed to act on the subsequent recommendations in a timely manner.
By visibly supporting these activities, the management created an
environment which expected everyone to follow the CAP protocol in
making decisions and that all the employees base these decisions on safety
concerns as well as on scheduling. Every employee does not need to believe
in this communication process, but they are required to practice it. Rewards
and penalties are based on the employee’s ability to follow the process.
With a demonstrated consistent support to the process, regardless of the
resulting recommendations, the employees gain confidence and build
safety as a shared value.
Case 8: MRM combining direct behavior change with awareness
instruction and error investigation.
A large airline has recently designed an MRM program based on the best
practices from the industry, together with innovative ways of adapting those
practices to their own company culture.
Program purpose. To expand the view of MRM providing participants
with awareness of human factors principles, to include skills training and
techniques to help identify and correct mistakes, oversights, and lack of
knowledge. Dirty Dozen issues initially emphasized are lack of
communication, lack of knowledge, and lack of teamwork.
The MRM program topics are: a) training for awareness and basic safety
skills, b) incident/error investigation, c) resolving differences in knowledge
and information for improved decision making, and d) baseline metrics for
trust, for errors and incidents, and for attitudes toward safety and
teamwork.
A one-day training session is planned for employees and managers in all
maintenance locations and functions. The syllabus is based on the topics
above, and contains the following six 45-minute modules.
1. Introduction to human factors concepts
2. The Dirty Dozen
3. Maintenance errors
4. Ways to eliminate errors
5. The company’s MRM program
6. Where to get more information
Maintenance error investigation (MEI) process. The company does
not currently have either a standardized information gathering process for
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maintenance errors and incidents. As part of their MRM program they
expect to provide maintenance leads and managers with a standardized
process to follow in error investigation, which will provide a means to
gather information about errors and how they occur. It will help determine
where to concentrate efforts for error reduction and prevention in the rest of
the MRM program. And it will reduce fear of unknown for those that may
have committed errors.
They expect to complete implementation of the awareness and skills
training before implementing their MEI process. Currently they expect to
obtain more training in MEI methods and to prepare an ASAP memo of
understanding (FAA, 1999). They will develop a process that will work best
for them.
Their MRM program will contain much of the best of MRM
development over the past decade—it is designed to be systemic,
integrated, data-based. Their experience with the process and its outcomes
will be monitored and assessed.
The Balance of Change
Based on the experience of the first three generations of MRM
programs, the fourth generation programs, such as the one described in
Case 8, are starting to address the issue of balance among individual and
organizational changes. In theory, both the individual and the organization
must change in order to effect a long-term change in the safety culture. The
first generation MRM program customized the concepts from CRM
training to maintenance by focusing on teamwork—communication
between two or more individuals—but it was still personal change and little
attempt to support it through organizational structure or process was made.
The second generation MRM programs used focus groups to solve specific
problems resulting in some organizational changes and some individual
changes, but because these programs were focused at specific problems,
once problems were solved and to continue the process proved difficult, the
programs were discontinued. The third generation MRM programs focused
on individual awareness resulting in mostly passive individual change.
Now, as illustrated in the figure below, the balance of organizational
change (cases 4 and 7) together with individual change (Cases 2, 3, 5 and 6)
is becoming an idea in good currency. This balance provides structure and
processes for individuals to practice the desired behaviors, as well as the
encouragement and personal support for individuals taking a positive
attitude about safety, as well as knowledge and skills for how to do it.
Strategy or purpose guides the balance. If either the organization or the
individual does not perform the requisite function, the resultant behavior
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will be unbalanced and not achieve the higher levels that are possible
through planning (Patankar & Taylor, 2000b).
CONCLUSION
Awareness programs as illustrated in Cases 5 and 6 raised the safety
consciousness among maintenance personnel and improved their attitude
toward safe practices. These programs achieved considerable success in
causing individual changes in coping with safety hazards. However in these
most recent programs there has been little change in communication. In
cases 2 and 3, where open and assertive communication was improved
through training, the positive results were not sustained. The behavior-
based programs, such as illustrated by cases 4 and 7, focused on promoting
the desired behavior rather than changing attitudes toward safety.
Consequently, the behavior-based programs achieved a more readily
observable change in behavior. This body of research has illustrated the
ability of MRM programs to influence several different areas ranging from
injuries and aircraft damage to paperwork error reduction. The fourth
generation of MRM programs appears to be based upon improving on these
successes as it moves toward an integrated, behavior-based philosophy.
Programs in this fourth generation, such as that described in Case 8, can be
expected to effect significant improvements in aviation safety. The fourth
generation MRM programs will be among the first to truly satisfy the
interactive part of the 1999 ATA definition of MRM programs. But this
success will depend on developing a process that builds interpersonal
trust—assuring the AMTs that they will be treated fairly—because the
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Figure 7. The Balance of Change
AMTs will have to be actively involved in identifying individual and
organizational errors to accomplish the next higher level of aviation safety.
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LEARNING STYLES OF PILOTS CURRENTLY
QUALIFIED IN UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
AIRCRAFT1
Craig A. Kanske, Sky Views, L.L.C.
Moore, Oklahoma
ABSTRACT
Kolb’s Learning Style Inventory was used to identify the predominant learning styles of
pilots currently qualified in United States Air Force aircraft. The results indicate that these
pilots show a significant preference for facts and things over people and feelings. By
understanding the preferred learning styles of the target population, course material can be
developed that take advantage of the strengths of these learning styles. This information can
be especially useful in the future design of cockpit resource management training. The
training program can be developed to demonstrate both that there are different learning styles
and that it is possible to take advantage of the relative strengths of each of these learning
styles.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study was to determine the learning styles of pilots
currently qualified in United States Air Force aircraft. How students learn
is impacted by how the material they are to learn is presented. Studies have
shown that more effective learning is achieved when programs take into
account the learning styles of the target population (Wooldridge, 1995).
Increasing student learning, the desired outcome of all instruction, requires
developing an ability to recognize students’ learning styles and use
techniques that increase the probability of achieving success (Anderson &
Adams, 1992).
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The study of learning styles has its roots in the field of psychology.
There have been two main paths for study as research has moved forward
from these roots. One path has followed the classic Pavlovian stimulus-
response approach, using reinforcement of successful completion at each
step in a sequential learning process. The other path has focused instead on
the cognitive processes in learning. Researchers conducting current studies
of learning styles have mainly chosen this second path, focusing on the
cognitive processes of the learner (Sims & Sims, 1995).
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, field dependence/field independence,
and brain hemispherocity studies are all examples of measures for
cognitive based learning. Another example is the Kolb Learning Style
Inventory. There are many other approaches to measuring learning styles,
with diverse terminology and measurement instruments. The common
ground for all of these approaches, however, is that they attempt to describe
the learning styles of the individual by measuring the individual’s behavior
during the learning process. Through this measurement, each instrument
attempts to describe how the individual takes in and processes information.
Sims & Sims (1995) provide an apt summary, stating that “…regardless of
how that process is described, it is dramatically different for each person”
(p. 194).
Kolb’s (1984) approach to measuring this learning process is through
the experiential learning model. The experiential learning model proceeds
from the assumption that all learning is influenced by the prior experiences
of the individual learner. Because of this assumption that prior experience
influences each new learning event, learning can be viewed as a continuous
process. How the learner progresses through this process, or uses this
process, becomes the focus for defining that learner’s learning style.
The experiential learning model describes four phases of the continuous
learning experience. Concrete experience is involvement with the learning
event, absorbing the surroundings and activities as they happen. Reflective
observation is reviewing the experiences and attempting to determine what
is new and different about the experience, and what is similar to previous
experiences. Abstract conceptualization is the process of integrating these
experiences and reflections into a modified view of the learner’s
environment. Finally active experimentation is the process of testing this
new world view (Kolb, 1984).
The “perfect” learner would use all four modes of learning equally, and
would shift around the learning model smoothly with each new learning
situation. The “normal” learner, on the other hand, develops a preferred
mode of learning. Whether this preferred style is adopted as the result of
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positive reinforcement in earlier, similar situations (Schmeck, 1988) or
rises from deeper, personality based roots, the effect is that the learner tends
to “specialize” in a specific style of learning. Identifying this preferred
style of learning is the focus of learning style research.
Kolb’s (1985) Learning Style Inventory uses twelve sentence stems with
four endings each to measure preferred learning style. Each of the sentence
endings indicates a preference for one of the four learning modes
associated with the experiential learning model. Summing the responses
for each of the twelve sentences yields a set of numbers between 12 and 48
which represents the degree to which the learner emphasizes each of the
four learning modes. These scores provide an indication of the balance
between the learning modes for the learner.
Because the four stages of the experiential learning model represent
polar opposites of two learning scales, it is possible to use the individual
element scores to derive a number which represents the individual’s
position along each of these scales. In Kolb’s (1985) Learning Style
Inventory this is done by subtracting the score for concrete experience from
the score for abstract conceptualization and subtracting the score for
reflective observation from the score for active experimentation.
The range of 12 to 48 on each individual learning mode yields range
extremes of plus or minus 36 for the active experimentation minus
reflective observation and abstract conceptualization minus concrete
experience scales. These formulas provide a numerical representation of a
learner’s relative emphasis for the types of learning represented by each
axis. There is no qualitative differentiation between the learning modes;
rather this process provides a way to display the results in a linear
presentation showing the relative strength of a specific style for an
individual.
The quadrant of the graph, formed by these two scales, which contains
the combined score for the individual defines that learner’s predominant
learning style.
Within the experiential learning model the quadrant formed by concrete
experience and reflective observation is called divergent learning. The
diverger prefers being a part of the learning experience, and thinking about
what has happened during that experience. The opposite preference lies in
the quadrant formed by abstract conceptualization and active experience
and is called convergent learning. The convergent learner takes multiple
observations of many events and brings them together into the answer to a
specific problem.
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The other two quadrants produce assimilative and accommodative
learners. The quadrant formed by reflective observation and abstract
conceptualization is called assimilative learning. The assimilator is the
inductive reasoner who can put together coherent theories based upon
observations, integrating multiple observations into a cohesive explanation
of the events. The active experimentation/concrete experience quadrant
produces the accommodative learner. The accommodator gets things done
and is part of the action.
Knowing which learning style the learner prefers provides important
information for course design. There is disagreement among researchers
over whether it is better to match the preferred learning style to ease the
learning process, or to mismatch the style to force the learner to “stretch”
into another style. Regardless of which method is preferred, however, there
is agreement that this decision must be designed into the course as opposed
to being the result of ignoring the possibility that differences in learning
styles exist (Sadler-Smith, 1996).
PILOT LEARNING STYLES
The emphasis in pilot training has followed the Pavlovian instead of the
cognitive path. Courses for pilot training are based upon task lists which the
student must master to successfully complete the training program. The
task is presented, demonstrated, and then the student practices until the task
is mastered. Appropriate feedback is provided by the instructor during the
practice session. There is no effort spent on determining the cognitive
based learning style of the student.
In this age of technology and information there is an effort to move some
of this training into the classroom using computer based training and
simulation (Thiesse, Newmeyer, and Widick, 1992; Treiber, 1994). It is in
this effort to apply new technologies to pilot training that understanding
learning styles can be helpful in course design. Once the learning style of
pilots is understood, the decision to match, or mismatch, these styles can be
a conscious one instead of being left to chance.
Currently the predominant learning style of pilots is not well
understood. Three studies by Quilty (1995, 1996, 1997) have addressed the
global versus analytical cognitive bias of pilots with differing levels of
experience. Studies by the United States Air Force (Carretta & Siem, 1988)
have focused on predicting the chances of a specific individual successfully
completing the Undergraduate Pilot Training program. This study used
Kolb’s (1985) Learning Style Inventory to identify the predominant
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learning styles of pilots currently qualified to fly United States Air Force
aircraft.
METHODOLOGY
Initially developed in 1976, and revised in 1984 (Kolb, 1976, 1984), the
Learning Style Inventory has been used, and validated, in such diverse
studies as comparing learning styles between high school and college
students (Matthews & Hamby, 1995), a cross-cultural comparison of the
learning styles between Western and Oriental learners (Auyeng & Sands,
1996), and comparisons of the learning styles among European
management training students (Jackson, 1995). Recent validation studies
such as that conducted by Willcoxson and Prosser (1996) have proven the
continued usefulness of the LSI as a measure of predominant learning
styles. Based on this history of use no pre-test evaluation of the Learning
Style Inventory was conducted for this study.
The sample for this study was generated by the data retrieval section of
the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC). According to S. Heitkamp
(personal communication, April 13, 1998) the data storage system has a
built in randomization process for extracting names from the master
personnel file based on the specified sort criteria. Using this built in system
a list of 600 pilots was drawn at random from the Air Force Master Officer
Personnel File. Copies of the Kolb Learning Style Inventory and an
accompanying demographic data questionnaire were mailed to these 600
United States Air Force pilots in March 1998. Two hundred thirty-three
surveys were returned by the end of June 1998, with completed and usable
instruments. Another 63 surveys were returned by the United States Postal
Service as undeliverable. The return of 233 of 537 surveys provided a 43.8
percent response rate for the study.
The original sample size was chosen using methodology developed by
Krejcie and Morgan (1970) to provide a 95 percent probability of matching
the population of 14,000 pilots in the United States Air Force. The rank
structure of the final sample very closely approximated this population,
with slightly fewer captains than expected, and slightly more majors than
expected. Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample relative to the
population for rank structure, gender, ethnicity, and type of aircraft flown.
Sample distributions for gender and ethnicity also closely approximated
population distributions. The sample held 5 percent females and 95 percent
males compared to a population of 2.5 percent female and 97.5 percent
male. Sample distributions for ethnicity were within two percentage points
in all categories. The distribution of the sample based upon type of aircraft
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flown was within 3 percent of the population distribution for all types of
aircraft. Distribution comparisons for female pilots were not meaningful
due to the small number in the sample.
Chi-square analysis of the expected distribution of the sample for rank,
gender, and ethnicity produced a statistically significant match between the
sample and the population. A Pearson product moment of 28.50146999,
with 12 degrees of freedom returns a probability of < 0.005 of achieving the
sample distribution by random chance.
FINDINGS
Kolb’s (1984) norming process for the Learning Style Inventory
produced median scores of 5.9 for active experimentation minus reflective
observation and 3.8 for abstract conceptualization minus concrete
experience. The sample result of 5.93 for the active experimentation minus
reflective observation axis shows there is no greater emphasis placed upon
active experimentation or reflective observation by pilots than is shown in
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Table 1. Sample vs. Population Distributions
Sample Population
percent percent
Grade Distribution
2LT 3.4 2.0
1LT 5.1 5.0
CPT 48.1 54.0
MAJ 27.9 24.0
LTC 15.5 15.0
Gender Distribution
Female 5.2 2.4
Male 94.8 97.6
Ethnic Distribution
American Indian/Alaskan 1.3 0.3
Asian/Pacific Islander 0.4 1.0
Black (non-Hispanic) 1.7 2.0
Hispanic 1.7 1.0
Other 2.6 1.0
White (non-Hispanic) 92.3 94.7
Aircraft Distribution
Fighter/Attack/Reconnaissance (FAR) 27.5 33.7
Tanker/Transport/Bomber (TTB) 57.1 60.1
Helicopter (HELO) 5.2 5.3
Other/None 0.0 0.5
Both 9.9 0.0
the general population. The sample result of 8.39 for abstract
conceptualization minus concrete experience, however, is significant. Two-
tailed t-test probability is less than .0001 for achieving this result at
random. Pilots show a significantly stronger tendency to emphasize
abstract conceptualization over concrete experience.
Based on this concrete experience and abstract conceptualization data, it
can be said that the average pilot in the United States Air Force
significantly emphasizes things and thought over people and feelings. The
reflective observation and active experimentation data reflects a preference
for active participation over observation; however, this preference is not
statistically different from the preference shown by the population at large
when compared to the norming sample (Kolb, 1984).
Descriptive statistics for the sample, showing the scores for each of the
six learning style measurements, are shown in Table 2.
LEARNING STYLES
Plotting active experimentation minus reflective observation and
abstract conceptualization minus concrete experience as the “X” and “Y”
axes of a grid forms a matrix which can be used to define the quadrants of
the experiential learning cycle. Kolb (1984) used this graphic
representation to plot the four learning styles (Figure 1). The median scores
for active experimentation minus reflective observation (5.9) and abstract
conceptualization minus concrete experience (3.8) define the intersection.
The mean values from the sample were 5.93 for active experimentation
minus reflective observation and 8.39 for abstract conceptualization minus
concrete experience. When plotted on the style grid these mean values fall
on the boundary between Converger and Assimilator. Medians for the
sample were 9.0 for active experimentation minus reflective observation
and 11.0 for abstract conceptualization minus concrete experience. The
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Table 2. Survey Results—Descriptive Statistics
Standard
Mean Median Deviation
Concrete Experience 23.85 20.00 10.28
Reflective Observation 28.98 28.00 6.47
Abstract Conceptualization 32.24 32.00 7.23
Active Experimentation 34.91 37.00 9.10
Abstract Conceptualization minus Concrete Experience 8.39 11.00 14.86
Active Experimentation minus Reflective Observation 5.93 9.00 12.41
plot for these median values falls within the Converger learning style.
When individual responses are plotted on this grid 15.8 percent (n = 37) are
accommodators, 23.6 percent (n = 55) are assimilators, 44.2 percent (n =
103) are convergers, and 16.3 percent (n = 38) are divergers.
This distribution of learning styles is significant (p < .0001) relative to a
hypothetical distribution of 25 percent in each style as would be shown in a
random sample of the population at large. This significance corresponds to
the predictive nature of the Learning Style Inventory (Kolb, 1984). In the
case of pilots currently qualified in United States Air Force aircraft, the
predominant learning style is convergence. A secondary learning style is
assimilation. Divergent and accommodative learning styles are each used
by significantly small groups of pilots within the study group.
The analysis of pilots’ learning styles was based upon average data for
the entire sample. Demographic data was collected for military rank,
gender, ethnicity, type of aircraft flown, and number of flying hours. In all
categories except ethnicity the convergent learning style was the
predominant selection at a statistically significant level. Analysis of
learning styles by ethnicity was not accomplished due to the small numbers
of non-white ethnic groups within the sample.
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Figure 1. Style Grid
CONCLUSIONS
The predominant learning style of pilots currently qualified in United
States Air Force aircraft is the convergent learning style. This learning style
fits within the predictive nature of Kolb’s (1985) Learning Style Inventory
as demonstrating traits which are valuable in specialist and technical fields.
There are implications for future course design to match this learning style.
Learners with the convergent style prefer to know how it works as
opposed to who says it works. These learners want to do it themselves
rather than being shown how to do it, but they would rather be shown that it
works than take an expert’s word that it works. This will be especially
important in the design of computer based training modules which
introduce new equipment and technology to pilots during training courses.
How the system fits together, and why it works, are more important to
convergers than just being told that the system works.
The secondary learning style for pilots currently qualified in United
States Air Force aircraft is the assimilative style. This style is included as a
secondary learning style because of the relationship convergent and
assimilative learning styles have relative to concrete experience and
abstract conceptualization. Both styles show a preference for abstract
conceptualization over concrete experience. The choice between a
preference for active experimentation over reflective observation is the
difference in learning preference which separates the converger from the
assimilator. Although more individuals fell into the converger learning
style than the assimilator learning style, the sample mean, very close to the
dividing point between these two styles, was used in considering the
assimilative style as a secondary learning style for the pilots in this study.
There are similar considerations for designing future courses for the
accommodative learners in the class. They share the converger’s desire to
know how something works rather than who says that it works. Their
preference for reflective observation, however, can lead them to look for all
the available alternatives and overlook the fact that they have a workable
solution already. Building into the training program justifications for
limiting the scope of information will be important for the assimilative
learner.
Taken together, the predominant converger learning style and the
secondary assimilative learning style support the effectiveness of the
current training program. The abstract conceptualization focus shared by
these two learning styles works well with the demonstration/performance
mode of teaching because of the focus on how things work as opposed to
who says these things work. By seeing how things are done, and
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understanding the implications, the abstract conceptualizer can work from
the individual parts to create a whole.
The balance between reflective observation and active experimentation
shown by the mean score of the sample also supports the current training
program. This balance between careful observation and risk taking, and
looking at problems from many angles and putting this information into
action form the basis for sound decision making in the time-critical nature
of aviation.
In short, the very things which are used to predict successful completion
of Undergraduate Pilot Training (Carretta & Siem, 1988) are the factors
which appear in the predominant learning style of current United States Air
Force pilots. The sorting process coincides with two elements of the
experiential learning model. The first element is socialization, where
working in aviation tends to emphasize certain characteristics within the
individual due to the requirements of the task. The second element is the
process of the individual tending to gravitate towards a field where the
requirements match that individual’s personal characteristics. This process
of specialization provides a basis for the predictive nature of the learning
style inventory and the experiential learning model (Kolb, 1984).
One of the current areas of emphasis in aviation training is crew resource
management. This training program emphasizes skills in relating to other
individuals, both on the crew and in positions which interact with the crew
focusing on team coordination, attitudes, behaviors, and communications
(Driskell & Adams, 1992). Addressing learning styles within crew resource
management training courses can provide an additional approach to
defining the issues for all crewmembers. Understanding individual
differences provides a critical stepping stone toward improvement within
these areas.
Pilots with the predominant converger learning style “…would rather
deal with technical tasks and problems than with social and interpersonal
issues” (Kolb, 1985, p. 7). The focus of crew resource management training
is these very social and interpersonal issues. The characteristics of the
convergent learner, as well as the other learning styles, should be
incorporated into course design for crew resource management training.
Analyzing the different learning styles, including the differences between
the styles and the strengths and weaknesses of each style, allows the group
to make better use of the skills available through its individual members
(Sims & Sims, 1995).
Incorporating learning styles into the design of crew resource
management training provides an opportunity for better understanding of
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the fact that there are different approaches to the same problem.
Understanding the differences in the approach and bias associated with
each learning style, and focusing on the learning style instead of the
individual, personal conflict over differences and misunderstandings are
possible (Sharp, 1997). This approach to the interpersonal issues associated
with functioning as an aircrew member provides an opportunity to address
these issues in a way that is compatible with all four learning styles.
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR FURTHER STUDY
This study identified the convergent learning style as the predominant
mode of learning for a statistically significant portion of currently qualified
pilots in the United States Air Force. A statistically significant distribution
of learning styles among these pilots was also identified. The information
gained through this process provides a starting point into understanding
how pilots learn. The convergent learning style is consistent with the
technical nature of aviation, the decision-making requirements of flying,
and the necessity to process large amounts of information during a flight.
Further study of the relationship among these three areas is appropriate.
Such studies would be useful in determining if correlations exist between
learning styles, cognitive biases, and successful completion of aviation
training programs. It would also be informative to know where, if
anywhere, within the training process the sorting for learning styles and
cognitive bias occurs.
This study further examined only currently qualified United States Air
Force pilots. A study comparing the learning styles of those individuals
completing Undergraduate Pilot Training with the learning styles of those
who failed to complete the course would be informative. Such a study
would necessarily include observations of the cause for failure to complete
the training program. Currently, qualified pilots exist who do not fall within
the predominant learning style. Understanding why certain individuals do
not successfully complete Undergraduate Pilot Training may provide
information which will allow more individuals with these minority learning
styles a greater chance of success in the training program.
The predominant learning style for all of the pilots in this study was
convergence. This style held a statistically significant position regardless of
gender, degree type, total flying experience, or military rank, which is also
an indicator of age. Why pilots share a predominant learning style,
regardless of other factors which indicate a tendency towards different
preferred learning styles, is a matter for further study. Information on what
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factors are shared by pilots, which become dominant factors in determining
preferred learning style, could be correlated with success and failure rates
for pilot training.
This study, and the above recommendations, applies to the training of
pilots in the United States Air Force. With almost 150 colleges offering
professional pilot degree programs (Schukert, 1995), and current interest in
the requirements for a non-technical doctoral program in aviation
(Johnson, 1997), the learning styles of students within these programs are
appropriate for study. A study focusing on college and university
participants would provide correlational data for comparison to pilots
training in the United States Air Force training program.
In addition to the cognitive bias studies conducted by Quilty (1995,
1996, 1997) on college students in aviation, and corporate and airline
pilots, studies of the primary learning styles of these groups of pilots are
also appropriate. Correlational studies among these groups would also then
be possible. These groups of pilots would also provide an opportunity for
longitudinal studies to determine the stability of learning styles over the
career of a pilot. Such longitudinal studies would be useful when
comparing career changes within aviation.
Understanding how pilots learn has significant implications for effective
training of current and future pilots. While learning style research has
investigated many learning situations, aviation students have not been
studied. The academic and personal benefits associated with matching, or
intentionally not matching, learning styles have been identified in many
areas. It is appropriate to bring this understanding to the aviation training
and education community. Incorporating the findings of academic research
into the training of pilots, academically and professionally, can provide this
same opportunity to enhance the learning process in this field of study.
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ABSTRACT
Accurate data is important in the aviation planning process. In this project we consider
systems for measuring aircraft activity at airports. This would include determining the type of
aircraft such as jet, helicopter, single engine, and multiengine propeller. Some of the issues
involved in deploying technologies for monitoring aircraft operations are cost, reliability, and
accuracy. In addition, the system must be field portable and acceptable at airports. A
comparison of technologies was conducted and it was decided that an aircraft monitoring
system should be based upon acoustic technology.
A multimedia relational database was established for the study. The information contained in
the database consists of airport information, runway information, acoustic records,
photographic records, a description of the event (takeoff, landing), aircraft type, and
environmental information. We extracted features from the time signal and the frequency
content of the signal. A multi-layer feed-forward neural network was chosen as the classifier.
Training and testing results were obtained. We were able to obtain classification results of
over 90 percent for training and testing for takeoff events.
Journal of Air Transportation World Wide Vol. 6, No. 2 – 2001
Charles A. Harlow received the Ph.D. degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of
Texas at Austin in 1967. In 1967, he joined the faculty of the Department of Electrical
Engineering at the University of Missouri in Columbia as an Assistant Professor. In 1972 he
was appointed to the rank of Professor. In 1974 he was a Visiting Professor with the
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at the University of California
at Berkeley. While at the University of Missouri, research programs in medical and industrial
image analysis were developed. In 1978 he joined the faculty of Louisiana State University in
Baton Rouge as Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering. He served as Director of
the Remote Sensing and Image Processing Laboratory (RSIP) from its inception in 1978 until
1990. His research interests include: image processing, environmental monitoring,
intelligent transportation systems, and medical image processing.
Weihong Zhu was born in QinHuangDao China in 1968. She received a B.S. degree in
electrical engineering from Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics in 1990. She
worked in industry for five years before attending Louisiana State University. Weihong Zhu
obtained her Master’s degree from Louisiana State University in the Department of Electrical
and Computer Engineering in December of 1999.
©2001, Aviation Institute, University of Nebraska at Omaha
INTRODUCTION
In this project we consider the development of a system for
automatically measuring aircraft activity at airports. This would include
determining the type of aircraft and the type of aircraft activity. The
different types of aircraft considered in this study are helicopter, single
engine, multiengine, and jet aircraft. An accurate count of aircraft
operations is important to airport managers and aviation planners. These
counts are difficult to obtain at non-towered airports.
BACKGROUND
A system for monitoring aircraft operations will likely include methods
for directly counting the aircraft as well as the use of ancillary and
statistical information to estimate total counts since it is unlikely that
counters will be in constant operation at all airports (FAA, 1985). At
airports without full-time tower facilities there are other indirect or
ancillary indicators of aircraft operations. If this information is put in a
database system, it will be useful in determining aircraft operations. The
following describes some indirect sources of information on aircraft
operations.
Many airports are associated with an approach control at a major airport
giving the major airports information about operations at small airports.
Some pilots do not use the services offered. Many airports have unicoms
(local advisory service from the airport operator). This information is
unreliable unless the operator is willing to log in arrivals and departures
since there is no recording of the transmissions. Even then, hours of
operation vary, and thus do not guarantee accurate information around the
clock.
Other sources of information are flight plans filed with Flight Service
Stations (FSSs). One disadvantage is that not every pilot files a flight plan
when flying cross-country, and most rarely ever file a plan for a flight
within the local area of their departure point. Another disadvantage is that it
may be difficult to obtain this information on a regular basis from FSSs.
Monitoring gas sales may also be considered, but this may be inaccurate
because of the variety of sales that may occur. Another method to assist in
assessment of aircraft operations would be to confirm the number and type
of aircraft based at each airport and survey each aircraft owner to determine
their normal aircraft use and flying patterns. Some pilots may use their
aircraft purely for pleasure once or twice each month. Further, these pilots
may perform touch and go maneuvers that will increase the airport usage.
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Others who use their aircraft for business may only make one departure and
one arrival each week. Another indicator is the category of airport. Some
airports have shorter runways that are stressed for heavy loads, thus
limiting the size and/or type of aircraft that operate at the facility.
Additionally, airports that don’t have any services or aircraft based at the
airport will likely be used less and airport personnel may be able to
accurately estimate the number of aircraft operations. While looking into
different airports, interviews with airport managers or fixed base operators
will give an indication of times that will assist the study such as “Peak
Month,” “Peak Week,” “Busiest Day,” as well as “Busiest Hour.”
The above ancillary information may be useful in estimating aircraft
operations and may be useful in determining where and when to monitor
aircraft operations at different airports. Since the above indicators do not
give direct counts, one still will need methods to directly monitor aircraft
operations. The best overall approach may be to build databases with the
above types of information and use statistical analysis and direct counts to
increase the reliability of the analysis.
TECHNOLOGIES FOR MONITORING AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS
The following review of technical literature indicates the approaches
taken for automatic aircraft detection and classification. Some of the issues
involved in deploying technologies for monitoring aircraft operations
include the cost of the monitoring operation, the reliability of the system,
the system must be portable, the system must operate self contained in the
field for two weeks, and the system must be acceptable at airports. The
costs of the monitoring operation includes capital equipment costs, travel
costs, labor costs, and overhead costs.
The technologies that have been considered are electromagnetic loops,
radar, microwave, radiation, video, pressure counters, and acoustic
technologies. Acoustic counters use a microphone located near the runway
to record takeoffs that produce a strong acoustic signal (Dress & Kercel,
1994). Total operations cannot be counted directly because landings are
quieter and do not register on the systems. The systems by Larson Davis are
used by a number of states to count aircraft operations. The aircraft counter
system has a high accuracy for counting takeoffs as reported by users.
These systems have the advantage of low cost, portable, and are a
demonstrated technology for operating in airport environments.
Tamayo et al. (1993) developed a magnetometric sensor for detecting
airport ground traffic with the goal of performing detection, discrimination
and tracking of static and moving targets. The authors also reviewed other
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methods for solving the problem of airport traffic control such as radar,
microwave gates, radiation, pressure sensors, acoustic sensors and loops
(electromagnetic). Radar was determined to be too expensive and can
easily be interfered with by obstacles. Radar can interfere with airport
operations and may be difficult to operate in this environment. Microwave
gates could not be installed flush to the ground, thus creating a potential
obstacle. Microwave gates can cause electromagnetic interference, which
is not acceptable in an airport environment. Radiation methods consisted of
detecting infrared signatures from the target. This approach was found to be
too sensitive to environmental fluctuations and weather conditions.
Pressure sensors such as pneumatic tubes were likely to break and require
maintenance that would be invasive to the flow of traffic and thus
undesirable. Acoustic sensors were thought to be unsuitable in noisy
environments. Ultrasonic sensors were dismissed due to their short range
and high power consumption. Electromagnetic loops were also dismissed
by the authors due to their invasive installation, maintenance and the
limited information that they deliver. The authors’ solution was to develop a
magnetometric sensor that would detect the magnetic fields produced by
ferro-metallic components in the aircraft, such as landing gear and wings.
The resulting sensor systems were able to detect cars at a distance of 10
meters and aircraft up to 20 meters from their axis (due mainly to ferro-
metalic components in the wings). While this range may be suitable for
controlling ground flow, it would not be sufficient for detection along the
runway as the distance to the aircraft to the sensor can easily exceed 20
meters if the aircraft is airborne when passing the sensor. The magnetic
signatures obtained from the sensors did provide clear discrimination
between vehicles and aircraft, but no information was given as to the ability
to differentiate between various types of aircraft.
Hudson and Psaltis (1993) investigated ways to identify a target aircraft
from one-dimensional radar range data. It was found that the quality of
classification depends not only on the aspect angle to the aircraft of the
radar site but also the number of range images examined for a single
classification. The usability of this method on airport traffic is questionable
since precise control of the aspect ratio would prove to be very difficult. As
such, one must consider the classification rates when no aspect angles were
taken into consideration. With rates of 57 percent, 65 percent and 86
percent for single profile, frame, and encounter classification, respectively,
we see that the classification rates are low. Couple that with the cost of
obtaining required permissions, installing, and maintaining radar sites at
strategic locations around an airport, and this method seems unfeasible.
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Adams and Esler (1995) describe a number of issues related to acoustic
recognition of aircraft events. It is noted that there is a change in the sound
quality as the aircraft approaches and departs from the observer. There are
differences between the sound emitted from the front and rear of an aircraft.
There is also the Doppler shift associated with the speed of the aircraft. It
was observed that for propeller aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters) there
are recognizable components in the acoustic signal that can be used for
Doppler analysis. Doppler analysis for jet aircraft is more difficult because
the spectrum is less coherent. Their analysis concluded that frequencies
above eight kHz could be ignored. Reported problems encountered were
difficult in determining corresponding features in the approaching and
departing signal, and one must make allowance for the angle of flight of the
aircraft relative to the observer. Some differences between speech and
aircraft signals are observed. Aircraft signals are continuous without breaks
as opposed to speech. However, aircraft signals have high variability due to
different environmental conditions, distances, and aircraft orientations.
Adams and Esler (1996) a recognition system based on a one-third-
octave filter bank and half-second Leq values from acoustic signals is
described. A data reduction algorithm is applied to the spectra to extract 25
features. A neural network is used to discriminate between helicopters,
fixed-wing propeller aircraft, jet aircraft, and background noise of
uncertain origin. The reduced data from 100 aircraft and background noise
events are used to train and test the classifier. Classification accuracy was
reported to be better than 80 percent.
Cabell and Fuller (1989) developed a recognition system for the
identification of helicopters, propeller aircraft, jet aircraft, wind turbines,
and trains from acoustic data. It is based on a decision tree. The features are
extracted from the Fourier spectrum and auto-correlation function of the
noise events. The best design could correctly identify 90 percent of the
recordings. Scott, Fuller, Obrien and Cabells (1993) tested an associative
memory and a multilayer perceptron neural network as alternatives to the
decision tree. On the same data set, results show that the associative
memory classifier identifies 96 percent of the sources correctly and the
neural network identifies over 81 percent of the sources correctly.
Two aircraft noise event detection systems based on one-second A-
weighted Leq time history of the acoustic signal are described by Wallis and
Snell (1995). The decision of classifying a noise event as caused by an
aircraft or not is based on a series of tests performed on the shape of the
time history Leq. In addition, an anemometer is used to provide
supplemental information on the speed and direction of the wind during the
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noise event. Special sensors located at the ends of the runway are used to
provide timing and directional data on the takeoffs and landings of aircraft.
Extensive field tests showed “excellent” performance.
Yamada, Yokota, Yamamota, and Shimizu (1985) describe an aircraft
classification system that utilizes acoustic data. It composed of a one-third-
octave spectral analyzer combined with a modified Gaussian classifier.
Nine features are extracted empirically from the output of the one-third-
octave band real-time spectral analyzer. The features consist of one-third-
octave band peak levels normalized with respect to the peak A-weighted
level of the noise event. Ten classes are considered in the first experiment:
three types of airplanes performing takeoff or landing, helicopters, jet
airplanes, propeller-driven airplanes. Sixteen classes corresponding to
sixteen types of airplanes are considered in the second experiment. Eight
classes corresponding to eight types of airplanes are considered in the third
experiment. The classification accuracy was 86 percent, 86 percent, and 90
percent, respectively, in the three experiments.
Some systems have been proposed for the classification (Cabell, Fuller,
& Obrien, 1992, 1993) of helicopter operations from acoustic data. They
are based on specific properties of the helicopter signal that is impulsive
and strongly periodic. They describe Gaussian classifiers and neural
networks applied to the identification of the type of a helicopter. Cabell and
Fuller (1991) developed a pattern recognition system to classify acoustic
signals from aircraft. Five classes of vehicles were defined for the purpose
of identification, namely, jet plane, propeller plane, helicopter, train, and
wind turbine. All sources taken together produced a recognition rate of 90
percent. The authors indicate that with classes such as jet planes, further
discrimination within the class is possible if additional features are used to
create more complex decision surfaces.
From the above review and our own experiences we note a number of
issues that complicate the recognition process (Harlow, Bullock &
Smailius, 1997). Aircraft acoustic signals have variability due to different
environmental conditions and aircraft distances. Acoustic classification
systems have difficulty differentiating other events from actual takeoffs and
landings. Examples are preflight throttle tests, echoes from large buildings,
vehicular ground traffic, and nature. Examples of vehicular traffic are
airport luggage transport, fueling trucks, and tractors for cutting grass.
Different airports and different weather conditions will affect the signals.
Noisy environments and natural phenomena such as thunderstorms provide
problems. Multiple signals from different sources will distort the signals.
Finally, aircraft of the same type will produce somewhat different signals.
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At present a satisfactory system does not exist. The different
technologies have different advantages and disadvantages.
Electromagnetic loop technology is expensive and maintenance can
interfere with operations. Magnetic field detectors have difficulty detecting
aircraft at a distance. Pressure counters are likely to break and maintenance
can interfere with operations. Also, they cannot determine aircraft type.
Radar is expensive, is sensitive to the location of the unit, and can interfere
with airport operations. Radiation (infrared) detection units are sensitive to
the environment and will have difficulty classifying aircraft types. It is
difficult to determine the type of aircraft from video signals. Acoustic
sensors have shown success as counters of aircraft operations. The units are
low cost and portable. They have difficulties with quiet aircraft landings
and may be sensitive to environmental conditions. At the present time
acoustic technology has proven effective in counting takeoffs and is the
most promising for future development. We decided to perform an analysis
of the costs factors related to developing acoustic technologies.
For these comparisons, it was assumed that one would need to monitor
aircraft movements at 50 different sites during a 168 hour period (1 week).
Factors considered in the comparisons were costs for development of
counting procedures, capital equipment costs, travel costs for moving
equipment and personnel, labor costs for operation of the equipment, and
overhead costs. Certain assumptions were made about labor, development,
and travel costs that influence the results. Hence the cost comparisons are
approximate.
Visual observations of aircraft by technicians is the simplest detection
technology. However, this requires scheduling technicians to obtain
complete 24-hour surveillance over a few days. During sunny and moderate
weather, this is not a problem. However, this is an undesirable job during
bad weather, extreme heat, and late in the evening. Furthermore, this
requires paying travel costs to lodge technicians in nearby hotels. For visual
observations it is assumed the crew visits 50 sites. It is assumed the travel is
100 miles to the site. The expenses are 100 miles of travel at $0.25 per mile
per person, plus 7 nights lodging at $40 per night per person, and 7 days of
meals at $21 per day per person. The labor costs for each crew member is
40 hours per week at $6 per hour for 52 weeks per year.
For the counter systems, we assume a one-person installation crew and
two round trips to a site 100 miles away (50 weeks at 4 trips per week at 100
miles per trip at $.25 per mile). Assuming one day for installation and one
day for removal of the system, the labor costs are (50 weeks at 8 hours per
day at $6 per hour for 2 days plus 160 hours of trouble shooting installation
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sites at $6 per hour). The equipment costs for pneumatic tubes is estimated
at $1,000 with a life time of five years. The equipment costs for an acoustic
counter is estimated at $6,000 with a life time of five years. The next issue
involves systems that require development. In this case the development
costs must be considered. This might be required for acoustic or other
systems that require additional development work. In this calculation, it is
estimated that $60,000 is required for development costs. We assume that
10 systems are acquired with a life time to five years. The development
costs are prorated and are reduced when the number of units acquired is
large. The cost of the units is estimated at $10,000 with a life time of five
years. The comparisons are shown in Table 1. One can observe from Table
1 that the technology based systems can be competitive on costs. Even if
some development costs are involved, the costs can be mitigated if a
number of units are acquired. For this reason it is advisable to have a vendor
involved with any development.
We decided to study the development of an aircraft monitoring system
based upon acoustic technology. This decision was based upon our review
of the technologies, a cost analysis of the different technologies, the
feasibility and cost of implementation of a portable unit, and the
compatibility of the technology with normal airport operations. Acoustic
technology exists to operate at airports in a counting mode. This study was
conducted to consider the issue of expanding the technology to include the
classification capability. The study was needed in order to determine
algorithms for classifying aircraft operations and to determine any problem
areas in the development and deployment of a system.
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Table 1. Cost of Different Technologies
Human Pneumatic Acoustic Enhanced
Observers Tubes Counter System
Equipment Development Costs $0 $0 $0 $600
Equipment Costs/Annual $0 $200 $1,200 $2,000
Travel & Mobilization
1 Person Crew $22,600 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500
Labor Cost $12,480 $5,760 $5,760 $5,760
Fringe (20 percent of Labor) $2,496 $1,152 $1,152 $1,152
Sub Total $37,576 $9,612 $10,612 $12,012
Overhead (0.4) $15,030 $3,845 $4,245 $4,805
Total Annual Cost $52,606 $13,457 $14,857 $16,817
Cost/Site $1,052 $269 $297 $337
AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS DATABASE FORMATION
In order to develop algorithms and evaluate the system for
characterizing aircraft operations, a database of aircraft operations was
created. The information contained in the database consists of airport
information, runway information, acoustic records, photographic records, a
description of the event (takeoff, landing) and aircraft type, and
environmental information.
The equipment used in the field for recording aircraft acoustic signals,
aircraft information, and the type of aircraft operation consisted of a digital
camera, sound recording equipment, and a form to manually enter
information related to the aircraft operation. The Kodak digital camera was
used for a photographic record of the aircraft operation. Acoustic
equipment was used to record the sound records of the aircraft operations.
This equipment consisted of a Larson Davis Model 712 Sound Level Meter,
Electro-Voice RE55 Microphones, and a Sony TCD-D8 DAT Walkman The
data were collected at 44.1kHz on the DAT tapes. We processed the data at
22.05 kHz since this proved sufficient for this application.
FEATURE EXTRACTION
Sound data are often processed in the root mean square of the sound
signal pressure p(t). The form is prms =
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with units of dB or decibels. This is the sound
pressure level (SPL). The quantity po is 20 micro Pascals, m Pa, which is the
perception threshold at 1000Hz (Couvreur, 1997; Crocker, (1998). The
sound pressure level Lp varies too fast for interpretation and often generates
too much data for storage. An averaging is performed over some interval to
reduce the amount of data. The equivalent continuous sound level over a
specified time interval is the equivalent steady level that would have the
same RMS value over that time interval (Couvreur, 1997). It is defined as
Leq = 20log10
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Because of the sensitivity of the human ear, often frequency weighting is
used. The most common weightings are A-frequency weighting,
C-frequency weighting, and LIN-frequency weighting. LIN-weighting is
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no weighting (Couvreur, 1997). A-weighting is widely used because it
correlates with the human response to sound. It is intended to simulate a
human ear at 40 phons. Sound level meters, SLM, sound exposure meters,
and noise dosimeters use A frequency weighting to measure the effects of
noise on humans. It is widely used to measure community noise. B
frequency weighting is meant to simulate the human ear at 70 phons. It is
not widely used. The C frequency weighted filter is meant to simulate the
human ear at 100 phons. It is flat over most of the audible frequencies. It is
down 3dB at 31.6 Hz and 8000Hz. It is often used to measure the acoustic
emissions of machinery.
Sound level meters equipped with filters are called spectrum analyzers.
Often data are collected in octave filters or one-third octave filters. An
octave band pass filter is a filter such that the upper cutoff frequency is
twice the lower cutoff frequency. An octave is a doubling of frequency. This
filter can be subdivided into one-third octave filters with 3 bands per
octave.
In the application of aircraft counting and classification, we are
interested in identifying aircraft from one-dimensional (1-D) sound
signals. This problem may be stated as an object identification problem
where the objects are the different types of aircraft. An audio sensor can
generate a significant amount of data in a few seconds. Hence, it is
important to extract features from the sound signal. An important step in
object identification is to obtain information suitable for modeling the
object to the automated recognition system. This process of reducing the
amount of data while retaining the ability to recognize the object is called
feature extraction. The features are represented as vectors. Figures 1 and 2
show the sound signals obtained from a jet and a multi-engine propeller
powered aircraft, respectively.
The Leq acoustic signal has a characteristic shape that is reflective of the
different types of aircraft events. The Leq signal can be processed to reduce
the number of measurements and extract features useful for classification,
see Figure 3. One measurement of relevance is the “maximum” value.
Some sound events such as jet aircraft are loud. Single engine propeller
aircraft landing are very quiet. Other measures can be related to the shape
of the curves. A fast aircraft such as a jet will have a curve that is steeper as
the plane approaches as compared to a propeller aircraft. Other
measurements extracted are “skewness” which measures the skewness of
the curve and “symmetry” that measures the symmetry of the curve about
the maximum value, see Figure 3.
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Figure 2. Sound Signal for Single Engine Aircraft Takeoff
Figure 1. Sound Signal for Jet Aircraft Takeoff
One would expect frequency measures to reflect differences in the
aircraft. These are readily obtained from portable spectral analyzers that
can operate in the field for several weeks. The measures we considered are
one-third-octave frequency measures since they are readily collected with
spectral analyzers. We used sound data at a sampling rate of 22,050 Hz.
This implies that we can estimate frequencies up to 22,050/2 Hz without
aliasing. For this reason, we limited our frequencies to 8,000 Hz.
Therefore, 27 frequency measures are taken up to 8,000 Hz. We extracted
these measures for the aircraft as it approached and departed the acoustic
sensor. The speed of the aircraft is reflected in the shift of the frequencies. It
should be noted that the frequency discrimination of the one-third-octave
filters is not sufficient to obtain an accurate measure of the Doppler shift.
CLASSIFICATION
Let us now consider signal classification which is the process of
identifying the object associated with a given input signal. Once the
features have been extracted as described in the last section, we will have an
n-dimensional feature vector that is the input to a classifier. Neural
networks were selected for the classifier.
Artificial neural networks (ANN) can be grouped into simple-layer and
multiple-layer nets (Fausett, 1994). There are two types of
training—supervised and unsupervised training for a network. Supervised
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Figure 3. Measurements form Time Domain
training is accomplished by presenting a sequence of training vectors, or
patterns, with associated target output vectors. Then, the weights are
adjusted according to its learning algorithm. Backpropagation nets require
supervised training. ANNs are “trained,” meaning they used previous
examples to establish the relationships between the input variables and the
output variables. Once an ANN is trained, the neural network can be
presented with new input variables and it will generate the output
classification.
A multi-layer feed-forward neural network was chosen as the classifier.
It is very important to define the network’s structure properly. In our case,
there are three layers in the neural network—an input layer, a hidden layer,
and an output layer. It is sufficient to have one hidden layer because it
reduces the complexity of the network. The number of input neurons
depends on the number of features used in classification. Because 35
features have been extracted from the aircraft sound record, 35 input
neurons are needed. The number of output neurons depends on the number
of classes of the aircraft being separated. Four output neurons will be
needed because four kinds of aircraft (helicopter, jet, multi-engine and
single engine) are needed to be distinguished. Each output neuron represent
two states—0 or 1. When it is active, the value is 1, so the aircraft belongs to
that class. The number of hidden neurons is crucial for a network’s
performance. If more hidden neurons are used, one gets a higher training
accuracy, but a lower testing accuracy. After several repeated training and
testing, we found that the performance is best for a network with a hidden
layer with 8 neurons (Harlow, 1999). This configuration was used with the
time domain and frequency measures of the approaching aircraft.
We had a total of 105 takeoff events for jets, multi-engine, and single
engine planes and helicopters. We used all of the available helicopter data
even though they were not all takeoff events. Helicopters will fly in
different paths to their landing area depending upon the traffic. They do not
follow runways and will in general take a path that keeps them near the
runway a short amount of time. One must be located near their landing area
to obtain a good takeoff or landing signal. We used 12 of the samples for
testing and the rest for training. The training results were 99 percent correct
classification. The accuracy of testing was 100 percent classification
accuracy. These results are given in Tables 2 and 3.
We conducted one final study. This study included 48 sound events that
were not aircraft events. Various background sound events such as tractors,
car, trucks, construction sounds, or natural sounds like thunder may occur
at airports. We collected 48 sound events of vehicles such as cars and trucks
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for this study. We also implemented a binary tree classification method
with a neural network classifier at each node of the tree. The tree
classification system is shown in Figure 4. We used 153 sound samples
consisting of 105 aircraft data and 48 vehicle events. Of these 133 samples
were used for training and 20 samples were used for testing. The training
results of correct classification were 100 percent. The testing results were
also 100 percent. The results are given in Tables 4 and 5.
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Table 2. Training Results
Helicopter Jet Multi-engine Single engine
Helicopter 13 0 0 0
Jet 0 11 0 0
Multi-engine 0 1 21 0
Single engine 0 0 0 47
Table 3. Testing Results
Helicopter Jet Multi-engine Single engine
Helicopter 2 0 0 0
Jet 0 2 0 0
Multi-engine 0 0 3 0
Single engine 0 0 0 5
Figure 4. Binary Tree Classification
The choice of features is an important problem in the development of a
classification system (Fukunaga, 1990). More features may allow one to
perform better classification, but the feature set often contains redundant
features. It is best to keep only the most effective features and remove the
redundant features. A reduction in the number of features results in reduced
complexity and computation time for the classifier. With a limited number
of training samples one may also get better classification rates with a
smaller number of features (Fukunaga, 1990).
We did some experiments to determine the most effective measures. We
extracted the time domain measures and also frequency measures as the
object approached and departed the acoustic sensor. For the aircraft vs.
non-aircraft experiment nine measures were found to be significant. Five of
these measures were frequency measures of the approaching object and
four were frequency measures of the departing aircraft. In the aircraft
category of helicopter vs. other aircraft, four measures were found to be
significant. These were a time domain measure (the slope of the curve), two
frequency measures of the approaching aircraft, and one frequency
measure of the departing aircraft. For jet vs. propeller aircraft, the most
significant measure was a frequency measure of the approaching aircraft.
For multiengine vs. single engine propeller the most significant measures
were a time domain measure of slope and two frequency measures of the
approaching aircraft. These results indicate that a reasonable subset of the
features can be extracted for classification. These results are not
conclusive, since additional data would need to be collected under a wide
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Table 5. Testing Results
Non aircraft Aircraft
Traffic 7 0
Helicopter 0 2
Jets 0 2
Multi-engine 0 3
Single engine 0 6
Table 4. Training Results
Non aircraft Aircraft
Traffic 41 0
Helicopter 0 13
Jets 0 11
Multi-engine 0 22
Single engine 0 46
variety of environmental conditions in order to determine the best
measures.
In order to provide for updating the system, a flexible software system
has been developed. The system allows one to process, display the raw data,
and perform classifications. The software also provides for retraining the
classification network as one experiments with the system and new data
becomes available. The software is programmed in Matlab (MathWorks,
1998).
DISCUSSION
Our discussion in the “Technologies for Monitoring Aircraft
Operations” section indicates that there are issues related to the deployment
of the different technologies for monitoring aircraft operations. Acoustic
technology was determined to be the best developed and the most feasible
technology upon which to develop an aircraft operations monitoring
system. This study considered the development of a classification system to
determine the type of aircraft involved in aircraft operations.
The results of the classification studies indicate that automatic
classification of aircraft takeoffs can be accomplished at acceptable rates.
Operations such as landings that are quiet events may not be detected. Also,
the monitors will have to be located near runways with aircraft operations.
If there are several runways or operations are occurring on the runway far
from the sensor, then the acoustic signal may be very weak at the sensor.
Several sensors may be needed to cover all the areas of operation. For
smaller airports, this should not be a problem. Since the automatic
classification of aircraft operations will not cover the operations at every
airport all the time, the automatic counts will need to augmented with
statistical models as discussed in the “Background” section.
These results demonstrate the feasibility of developing an automated
aircraft operations monitor. Current hardware exists for portable operation
that will record the time and spectral information required for
classification. The system needs further testing with data collected under
varying environment conditions. It is difficult to obtain data under adverse
weather conditions due to the risk to personnel near runways under adverse
conditions. The next stage in the work would be to place an automated data
collection system in the field to collect data under adverse conditions. In
addition, studies need to be conducted on the best manner to incorporate
automatic aircraft operations counters with statistical and ancillary
information in order to obtain the best estimate of aircraft operations.
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ABSTRACT
The air transport policies of small states are currently at a crossroad. Policy makers in these
countries are facing a difficult dilemma: either follow the general trend of liberalization and
pay the high cost of the resulting restructuring or maintain the existing regulatory and
ownership structures at the risk of isolation thus undermining the viability and sustainability
of their air transport sector and their economies in general. This paper proposes to explore the
broad issues raised by this difficult dilemma, to outline its special significance in the context
of small states and to delineate the options opened to the economic policymakers in these
states. After a brief note on the method of research, we sketch the main elements of the
international air transport industry in which the airlines of small states are called upon to act.
We then propose to review the main features of the analytical framework of this debate as it
pertains to the special circumstances of these states. Then we focus on the challenges facing
the airlines of Small States, while the next section proposes a number of the alternative policy
options open to the policy makers in these states. The main conclusions are drawn in the final
section.
INTRODUCTION
Small states1 are especially vulnerable to exogenous shocks and are
facing the increasingly difficult task in meeting the challenges of
globalization. The international community has long recognized this fact
and several multilateral institutions and donor countries have taken a
number of initiatives to assist these states to overcome this handicap. The
economies of these states are often dependent on a single industry that is
often their main, and sometimes the only, source of foreign currency.
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Furthermore, because most of these small states are geographically isolated
from their main trading partners, air transport is often the main link to the
outside world both for the transport of passengers and freight.
At the same time, many states have embarked on a major effort to
overhaul and liberalize their air transportation markets. Some countries,
inspired by the relative success of similar policy changes in other countries
such as the U.S. and the EU, have done so willingly, although not without
painful sacrifices, while others maintained a (healthy) dose of scepticism
and thus remain reluctant to move in the same direction. Small states are no
exception, and their air transport policies are currently at a crossroad.
Policy makers in these countries are facing a difficult dilemma: either
follow the general trend of liberalization and pay the high cost of the
resulting restructuring, or maintain the existing regulatory and ownership
structures at the risk of isolation thus undermining the viability and
sustainability of their air transport sector and their economies in general.
This paper proposes to explore the broad issues raised by this difficult
dilemma, to outline its special significance in the context of small states
and to delineate the options opened to the economic policymakers in these
states. The research method adopted in this study, is primarily desk
research, laced however with healthy dose of the author’s access to,
hitherto, unpublished primary information and informal private interviews.
The next section outlines the main elements of the international air
transport industry in which the airlines of small states are called upon to
act. The main features of the analytical framework of this debate follow this
section as it pertains to the special circumstances of these states and the
challenges facing the airlines of small states. Based on these findings,
alternative policy options and recommendations open to the policymakers
in these states are discussed. Finally, the main conclusions are drawn.
A NOTE ON THE RESEARCH METHOD
This is a policy-oriented paper, rather than a theoretical or an empirical
work, and as such its main objective is to evaluate the policy options
confronting the aviation industries of small states, within the existing
institutional framework, based on well-grounded economic principles. The
main source of information regarding the institutional environment and the
relevant analytical framework was desk research on the various key aspects
of this, otherwise convoluted, subject involving several international
agencies and different strands of literatures. However, as member of the
Advisory Board to the Commonwealth/Word Bank Joint Task Force
(CSWB Task Force) on Small States for several years, the author was able
to participate in several, panel discussions, study groups and seminars, as
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well as have access to numerous published and unpublished original
research material, involving several aspects of the economies of small
states. In addition, as a discussant and commentator on several of the papers
that were considered and/or commissioned by the CSWB Task Force, he
conducted several informal interviews with key policymakers and had the
opportunity to acquire first-hand experience on some of major
globalization challenges facing small states. In fact, it is in the context of
these activities that it became clear to this author that the formulation of a
coherent air transportation policy, enabling small states to meet the
challenges of globalization, has to become a major priority for them and a
subject in dire need for additional original theoretical and empirical
research.
SMALL STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY
In addressing the issue of the air transport policy of small states one is
faced with a multifaceted reality covering a wide breadth of issues. These
range from the sector-specific regulatory framework facing decision-
makers, namely the system of multilateral agreements established within
the context of ICAO (1992, 1993) and the various bilateral agreements
currently in effect, as well as the wider nexus of regional and multilateral
trade, economic and political relations. Clearly, therefore, anyone
attempting to pinpoint and isolate the salient elements of this framework is
facing a daunting and a somewhat arbitrary task heavily tainted by the
idiosyncrasies of the analyst. It is, nevertheless, possible to identify the
prominent global trends that are currently shaping the industry, and are
likely to do so in the foreseeable future.2
During the last few years, the Commonwealth Secretariat and the World
Bank (WB) undertook a sustained and concerted effort in recognizing and
addressing the developmental needs of small states. As more Multilaterals
and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs) are drawn into this
process, new economic challenges and opportunities will become available
for these states. Nevertheless, given the dominance of the U.S. economy on
the world stage and the increasingly aggressive stance adopted by the EU in
international economic affairs, it is safe to assume that developments in the
international air transport field will, to a great extent, be determined by the
policies of these two economic superpowers. In addition, and
notwithstanding the demises of the Seattle meeting, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) is bound to increasingly become the main forum in
which nations will be attempting to sketch the broad institutional
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framework that will shape future trade relations in general, and trade in air
services in particular.
Small States: Meeting the Challenges in the Global Economy3
In 1985 the Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec) published a ground-
breaking report on the Vulnerability of Small States in a Global Economy
(ComSec, 1985). Since then, ComSec has carried out a sustained advocacy
and research effort addressing the special characteristics of these states
which culminated in 1998 with the establishment of Commonwealth
Secretariat/World Bank (CSWB) Joint Task Force.
For the purposes of the CSWB Joint Task Force, small states are the 44
developing countries with a population below 1.5 million people. Thirty-
three of these countries belong to the Caribbean region, East Asia and
Pacific and Africa while the remaining two are in South Asia, two in the
Middle East and three in Europe (ComSec, 1985, 1997). Note that although
there is some overlap, this is not the same group of 33 countries that are
included in the United Nations’ Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) study on Small Island Development States (SIDS) (United
Nations, 1994). Also note that although their population is over the 1.5
million threshold, for the purposes of the Task Force, Jamaica, Lesotho,
Namibia and Papua New Guinea are included among the Commonwealth
Small States “because they share many of the characteristics of smallness”
(1985, p. 4). These characteristics, chosen for their important implications
for development are: remoteness and insularity, income volatility,
susceptibility to natural disasters, limited institutional capacity, limited
diversification, openness, access to external markets, and poverty.
At the beginning the purpose of the CSWB Joint Task Force was to
“assess the case for special treatment advanced by the Commonwealth
small states at the Edinburgh Heads of Government Meeting and enable the
[World] Bank to examine its instruments for assisting these countries…”
(p. 1). After a series of consultations, conferences and the publication of an
Interim Report, the agenda was widened and number of multinational
institutions (i.e. the EU, the WTO, the International Monetary Fund, the
United Nations, the United Nations’ Development Program, and major
regional development banks) and major donor countries were asked to
submit frameworks.
The final report defines a measure of vulnerability and identifies the
economic implications of small size and the emerging challenges. In
addition, it addresses the policies, challenges and opportunities that these
countries are likely to face in the immediate future. These include, inter
alia, ways of tackling volatility, and mitigating vulnerability and natural
disasters—such as catastrophe insurance and commodity risk management,
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issues of transition to the changing global trade regime—such as the
erosion of trade preferences, strengthening capacity and external
assistance, and the new opportunities from globalisation—like
international financial services, information technology and e-commerce.
The Task Force concluded that addressing these challenges successfully will
take a combination of the following: correct domestic policy action; in some
cases new approaches to regional co-operation; continued external support
and assistance multilateral and bilateral development institutions; and
improvements, where achievable, in the external environment (ComSec 2000,
p. 3).
Although the Report does not make specific reference to international
air transport as such, it is nevertheless clear to us that the issues tackled
therein, and many of its recommendations as set out above, have immediate
and direct relevance on this specific sector. In particular, we argue in this
paper that the challenges that the airlines of small states currently face must
be addressed in the framework outlined this Report and in particular as a
combination of the “right” domestic air transport policy, coupled with new
approaches to region co-operation in aviation policy.
International Air Transport Policy in the U.S. and the EU
The U.S. “Open Skies” Policy
The U.S. has traditionally advocated an “Open Skies Regime” in its
negotiations with other countries, although with limited success. For Toh
(1998), the decisive impetus came at the end of 1978 when the U.S.
Congress adopted the Airline Deregulation Act and in 1979 with the
passage of the International Air Transportation Competition Act. As a
result, U.S. negotiators endeavoured to “trade competitive opportunities” in
their bilateral negotiations, a strategy that best describes the policy stance
that ensued. Indeed, Toh (1998) argues that the aim of this policy was
…to ensure that mutual concessions were to be of a liberalizing nature. It was
expected that increased open competition will result in greater consumer
benefits through increased travel options and reduced hares and rates,
improved airline efficiencies through more extensive and rational routes
structures, and general increase in economic welfare (pp. 62–3).
The repercussions of this policy were the negotiation of a series of
“liberal” bilateral agreements between the U.S. and several Far Eastern
countries, as well as with a number of “key” European partners. By and
large, these agreements gave the U.S. airlines significantly greater pricing
freedoms, enhanced market access through multiple carrier designation,
unlimited freedom to set capacity and a curtailment of (host) government
regulations. Several major European countries and Japan were, at first,
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reluctant to follow the U.S. on its “Open Skies” policy, fearing the
domination of their markets by U.S. carriers.
In fact, the choice of “consenting” partners was dictated by three key
considerations. Contrary to large countries, small states generate relatively
little third and fourth freedom traffic thus standing to gain more from
greater access to the lucrative U.S. market and, through fifth freedom
traffic, beyond. This prospect made them more willing to trade
“competitive opportunities” with the U.S. Furthermore, there were also
strategic considerations in the choice of these partners. McMillan (1989)
argues that, from a game-theoretic perspective, in trade negotiations the
bargaining power of a country is directly proportional to the concessions it
is willing to exchange.4 In this context, it is clear that small
(underdeveloped) states individually are “ideal” trading partners, with
virtually zero bargaining power vis-à-vis the U.S.5 Furthermore, partners
were also chosen on the basis of the stated “encirclement strategy”. Indeed,
U.S. policymakers (correctly) anticipated6 that by signing a series of liberal
bilateral agreements with minor alternative European and Far Eastern
gateways, will bring pressure to bare on major competing partners (such as
France, Italy, Britain and Japan), by diverting traffic to these alternative
cheaper destinations.7
It is well documented and thus legitimate to argue that the world aviation
industry has undergone major changes since the adoption of the “open
skies” policy. These changes include, inter alia, the decline in IATA’s cartel-
like tariff-setting ability,8 the gradual emergence of mega-carriers through
airline consolidation, the prolifaration of strategic alliances between major
carriers, the drive towards privatazation of national carriers and the
deregulation of national markets. However, notwithstanding the declared
pro-competitive aim of this policy, Abeyratne (1998) argues that
…it cannot be claimed incontrovertibly that an open skies policy…is not
totally lacking in overprotectiveness. Most nations [including the U.S.] still
give usually high priority to the marketing policies of their airlines, which are
naturally geared to world protectionism and exploitation (p. 40).
In fact the author offers evidence suggesting that several developing
countries view with certain suspicion this policy, considering the great
reluctance by the U.S. (and other developed countries) to open-up their own
domestic markets to market forces.9
In addition, according to Wassenbergh (1996), quoted by Abeyratne
(1998), it would seem that the very concept of “open skies” is itself not
unambiguous and appears to have evolved in the framework of successive
bilateral agreements. Whereas it was first understood that a necessary and
sufficient condition for its implementation was that the carriers of both
signatories had a fair and equal opportunity to operate, it was later “re-
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interpreted to mean fair and equal opportunity to compete and later still,
fair and equal opportunity to effectively participate in the international air
transportation as agreed.” (Abeyratne, 1998, p. 41). Although the “open
skies” policy “a la U.S.” still faces major obstacles and strong opposition in
many countries (Toh, 1998, pp. 64–66), there is no doubt that it has been the
decisive factor in the general drive towards enhanced competition and
greater efficiency in international air transportation and, as a result,
“protectionism in commercial aviation should give way to some degree of
liberalization in the least” (Abeyratne, 1998, p. 40).
The EU Common Air Transport Policy
The need for a Common Transport Policy is explicitly acknowledged in
the Treaty of Rome (1958) as being an integral part in the construction of a
Common European Market. But, the efforts for the definition of a Common
European air transport policy began only in 1975 with the publication of a
relevant European Commission (EC) Recommendation, followed by a
1979 EC Memorandum on bilateral agreements and state subsidies.
Nevertheless, for Morrell (1998), and many other informed observers, it
was the landmark 1984 “Nouvelles Frontieres” European Court of Justice
(ECJ) ruling and the adoption of a Single European Act that were the
decisive steps towards the formulation of a Community-wide aviation
policy.
However, contrary to the U.S. one-shot-total-liberalization approach,
the European model called for a gradual and protracted process going
through successive packages/stages, spanning from 1988 to 1997
(Stasinopoulous 1992, 1993). The first two packages called for gradual
“loosening” of intra-European bilaterals, while
…the third package of 1992 for the first time replaced the bilateral system
with a multilateral system of air transport regulation. It established common
rules for the award of an air operator’s certificate, open access to air transport
routes within the Community, and the freedom to set airfares and rates
according to commercial criteria. These rules moved away from the
requirement of national ownership and control by creating the concept of a
Community air carrier…open[ed] up traffic rights on all intra-Community air
carriers (with full cabotage from 1997), with few exceptions, and remove[d]
capacity restrictions (Morrell, 1998, p. 46).
In order to mitigate and anticipate some of the negative effects that U.S.
deregulation has had on U.S. consumers, the EU decided to also include
consumer protection in its Common Air Transport policy. For the EU
Commissioner for Energy and Transport Ms. Loyola de Palacio the
development of a “Passenger’s Charter,” “would establish in the clearest
possible terms a set of consumer rights” (European Commission, 2000,
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p.3). The Charter will be addressing issues “…such as the contractual rights
of passengers, tariffs, comfort and health…financial protection of the
passengers in case of air carrier bankruptcy, air carriers’ commercial
practices like code sharing and frequent flyer programmes and information
to the passenger” (pp. 4–5).
In assessing the impact of these liberalization measures on EU
consumers, Morrell (1998) argues that although several significant barriers
remain—including administrative, infrastructure capacity constraints,
imperfect input markets, economies of scale and lack of access to adequate
finance—between 1992 and 1994, EU travellers benefited “…from air
fares [that] were on average a little more than ten percent below the levels
that they would have been without liberalization” (p. 59). Furthermore,
Alamdari (1998) concludes that these measures also had beneficial effects
on the labour productivity of EU carriers and that
…in the period 1991 to 1995, unit labour costs fell by approximately 38
percent as a result of the fast growth in productivity. In the same period, wages
only increased 15 percent on real terms. It appears that the airlines were
paying their staff only slightly more for proportionately greater productivity.
This is possible because an increase in outsourcing has a tendency to increase
the average unit labor cost by reducing the number of lower paid employees
while boosting productivity (p. 82).
Air Transport Services Trade and the GATS
The Services Trade debate
Trade in aviation services is a prime example of services trade10 and as
such were at the centre of the efforts to liberalise trade at a multilateral level
during the early 1980s. The discussion on commercial policy in services
trade has centred on the antagonism between the developed countries,
under the leadership of the U.S., and the developing countries guided by
India and Brazil. The controversy was sparked by the reluctance of
developing countries to include services in the multilateral trade
framework. This unwillingness was primarily motivated by two sets of
concerns: economic and non-economic reasons. On economic grounds,
developing countries believed, as argued by Bhagwati (1985), that
industrial countries enjoy a clear comparative advantage in services and
any liberalization would therefore compromise their own export in
services. A number of countries suspected that the new focus on services
was used by the U.S. to distract attention from the main issue at hand,
namely the trade in goods for which they enjoy a comparative advantage,
especially in labour-intensive goods. Sapir (1985) and Hindley (1988)
argue that although both concerns had some empirical support, developing
countries could also benefit from cheaper imports of services, especially
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when they are used as intermediary inputs. However, there are other more
profound economic reasons behind the stance adopted by many countries
during these negotiations. National governments, especially in developing
countries, will engage in the process of liberalization of international
services trade only if this will be a net benefit for the development of their
respective economies. Indeed, Sampson (1989) observes that the
contribution of imported services to economic development is not merely
limited to them being imported factors of production or consumption.
Imported services could contribute significantly to the international
competitiveness of an economy, the efficiency of domestic production,
domestic relative prices, and the structure of production and the allocation
of domestic resources.
Furthermore, it is a well known that services are prone to regulation for
non-economic reasons. In particular, the liberalization of the trade in
services often implies the substitution of internationally uncompetitive
domestic services activities with services supplied by foreign producers.
Thus trade in services often implies the importation not only of the service
as such, but also of foreign labour and capital which could be contrary to
national provisions. In addition, given that services include some of the
most politically, militarily and culturally sensitive (infrastructure)
activities, governments are often reluctant to surrender their provision and
control to foreigners.
We note here that both these sets of arguments were particularly relevant
to small states because they are especially sensitive to matters pertaining to
their national sovereignty and economic independence. In fact one can
argue that debate surrounding services trade epitomises many of the
grievances of small states with respect to the emerging trading regime in a
globalized economy (ComSec, 2000).
The eventual inclusion of services in, what is now commonly referred to
as the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in Punta del Este was the
result of a compromised brokeraged by the, then, European Community.
The series of negotiations under the Uruguay Round eventually culminated
in a framework agreement distinct from that on goods and known as
General Agreement for Trade in Services (GATS).
Recall that following Bhagwati (1985) and Sampson and Snape (1985),
it is useful and customary to classify the modes of delivery of services on
the basis of the required physical proximity between Users and Providers.
According to the typology of international transaction in services11 there
are four possible modes of delivering services. Mode 1, in GATS parlance
Cross Border Supply, requires that neither the Users nor the Providers
need to move (like in commodity trade). Mode 2, known as Consumption
Abroad, implies that Users have the freedom to move (either temporarily
Antoniou 73
or permanently) but Providers do not. In Mode 3, also known as
Commercial Presence, Users do not move while Providers have the
freedom to establish or operate a branch, agency or subsidiary. In Mode 4,
called Presence of Natural Persons, Users do not move but now Providers
may enter and stay temporarily in order to supply the service.
In fact, Sapir and Winter (1994) argue that, as far as GATS is concerned,
the most contentious issue has been the interface between these four modes
of delivery and the participation of the developing countries. It is in this
context that some industrial nations used the application of the principle of
the most-favoured-nation treatment (MFN)12 as a bargaining chip against
granting freedom of establishment.13
Alternatively, some nations proposed a symmetric treatment of labour
and capital as far the ‘right of establishment’ is concerned as a means of
overcoming the developing nations’ reluctance. Eventually, the GATS
framework agreement signed in 1994 established, under Article II, MFN as
a general obligation applicable to all measures affecting trade in services.
Furthermore, signatory states submitted (schedules) of specific
commitments pertaining to market access, namely the ability of foreign
providers of services to penetrate domestic markets, and national
treatment, an obligation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of foreign
nationality. Although GATS offers only a partial coverage of air transport
services,14 it is the only sector amongst the limited number of sectoral
annexes to the Agreement where an explicit “positive list” of services
covered is provided. These services are (a) aircraft repair and maintenance
services, also known as maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO); (b)
computer reservation system (CRS) services; (c) the selling and marketing
of air transport services.
The GATS Annex on Air Transport Services
A recent WTO (1998) study looks at the trade in Air Transport in
Services in the context of GATS. It notices that paragraph 2 of the Annex
excludes the granting of traffic rights from GATS as well as the services
directly related to the exercise of these rights. However, the above three
services contained in paragraph 3 are excepted from the exclusion are
therefore covered under GATS. Furthermore, the study notices that while
the above three services are the only services ‘directly related to the
exercise of traffic rights’ that are covered, the wording of the Annex implies
that those services that are not directly related to the exercise are also
covered.
Looking at these sectors separately, starting with MRO, the study
observes that recent estimates (based on 1996 data), value this market at
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between U.S.$23 and 28.5 billion, forecasted to reach by 2005 U.S.$33
(WTO, 1998, pp. 2–3). Furthermore, it is customary to sub-divide MRO
into different segments: upkeep of engines, representing 30 percent of
turnover, heavy maintenance of airframes (27 percent), line maintenance
(22 percent, not covered under GATS), and upkeep of components (21
percent).15 There are also different types of operators active in these
markets, such as, airlines working on own account (“airline captives”),
airlines working on behalf of other carriers (“airline third party”), after
sales services by original equipment manufacturers (OEM). The WTO
study notes that in recent years, there is a growing trend for joint ventures
between these types of operators. Clearly though, the key issue as far as
regulation is concerned is flight safety and quality. At the multilateral level,
standards and regulations are determined within the framework of ICAO
(1994, pp. 31-34), while national authorities and bilateral agreements may
also have a significant impact on air safety.
Clearly the delivery of MRO’s fall under either Mode 2 or Mode 3 and
are, respectively, determined by the freedom of consumption overseas and
of establishment of foreign maintenance facilities in third markets.
Referring to Table 1 in the Annex of the study (compiled by ICAO, not
included here), the WTO notices that all except one WTO Members have
MFN obligations on air maintenance and that there was, between 1995 and
1998, a “general increase in the number of new facilities established”
(WTO, 1998, p. 4). It also notices however, that “this is more likely to result
from market growth than from the effects of GATS, but…that six of the 13
newly created facilities have been in countries with GATS commitments in
this sector” (p. 4). In the case of small states however, a slightly different
picture seem to emerge. It would seem that, as far as MRO are concerned,
for the period 1995–1998, these states have not benefited from GATS since
none has had or has acquired any new repair and maintenance facilities.
Turning to the computer reservation system (CRS) services, GATS
defines them “as services provided by computerized systems that contain
information about carriers’ schedules, availability, fares and fare rules, for
which reservations can be made or tickets may be issued” (WTO, 1998,
p. 4). In the classic pattern of CRS operations, customers do not have direct
access to the information provided by the CRS supplier.16 They use the
services of an agent who acts as a broker between the customer, and the
airline and CRS provider. Because CRS providers started as subsidiaries of
major airlines, this segment of the market (with an estimated annual
turnover of U.S.$4 billion) is highly concentrated, with growth estimated
up to 2015 varying between 3.6 percent to 5.5 percent annually. For the
classic pattern, the main concern from the regulatory point of view was the
danger of collusion between the CRS supplier and a specific carrier and the
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need to ensure a non-discriminatory treatment of the all airlines in the
system. This objective was by-and-large achieved through the adoption by
the major aviation powers, the U.S. and EU authorities, of Codes of Good
Conduct instituting on a neutral quid pro quo system. This amounted to
reciprocity-based treatment, which of course were subject to MFN
exceptions, also accompanied by the establishment of major suppliers. In
fact the WTO study notices that in terms of the GATS mode of supply
introduced earlier, trade in CRS services are essentially carried under Mode
3, namely through the establishment in each country of National Marking
Companies (NMC) with which the local airline or travel agents are
associated. In some cases NMC are used as spring boards for export in
neighbouring countries, which means that CRS services can also be
supplied under Modes 1 or 2 or even mode 4. Looking at the effect that the
existence of commitments has had on the export of CRS services, the study
concludes that, “there seems to be no correlation between the development
of the number of suppliers and the existence of commitments”(WTO, 1998,
p. 11). Again focusing on small states it can be inferred from the same
table, that, by and large, they benefited from the arrival of new suppliers of
CRS services as a result of commitments.
Finally, in the case of sale of Marketing and Sales services, the WTO
(1998) study notices that while the wording of the Annex restricts the
definition of these services to those undertaken by the airline itself…
And does not cover these activities when carried out by CRS and ERSP [i.e.
Electronic Reservation Service Providers] suppliers and travel agents…the
Annex definition says nothing about those to whom sales are made.
Potentially, therefore, it covers not only direct sales to private or business
clients but also block sales of seats to travel agencies and tour operators
(notably in the charter market (p. 12).
It estimates that the tickets sold directly by airlines on regular flights is
about 20 to 30 percent of all tickets sold and represented in 1995 a figure of
up to U.S.$40 billion (twice the size of the MRO market and ten times that
of the CRS services), about 16 percent of their operational expenses (figure
that includes commissions).
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR AN
AIR TRANSPORT POLICY FOR SMALL STATES
There are two main strands of literature that have a direct bearing on the
issues raised in this paper. To start with, airlines are a prime example of
network-based business, others include banks, telephone companies,
railroads, cable television, sewage system, inland water transport, postal
and package delivery, oil and gas pipeline. As such these industries share a
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number of characteristics that often lead to market failures and thus have
attracted the attention of policymakers and business strategists alike. We
will highlight some of the public-policy dilemmas and strategic issues that
often attach to these industries as they relate to the airline industry. Next, as
is convincingly argued in the ComSec Report and is clearly illustrated by
the EU Common Aviation Policy, regional integration can be an effective
policy to deal with the challenges of globalisation in the air transportation
field. However, trade economists are still arguing whether regional trade
agreements (RTAs) are, as Bhagwati (1991) put it, “building blocks” or
“stumbling blocks” toward multilateral trade liberalisation. We will review
the salient points of this debate.
International Aviation as a Network Industry
Broadly speaking, networks comprise links that connect nodes
(Economides, 1996; White, 1999). The route system of a typical airline
designed on the hub-and-spoke model is a prime example of a “simple-star-
two-way network.” This means that all routes go through a central node
while any non-central node can be the origin or destination of a trip. As
such, route networks of airlines exhibit some special features that are
especially relevant to economic policy namely, (positive) technological
externalities, and economies of scale/scope, network compatibility and
standards. Consider for example an airline with the smallest possible
network: one central node C and a single destination A. Here there are only
two possible origin-destinations (ODs), namely routes C-A and A-C.
However, if we add a second destination, say B, then there potentially four
extra ODs to the network: C-B, B-C, A-B, and B-A. Clearly, the addition of
an extra destination to an n-dimensional network will create 2n new
potential destinations thus enhancing the value of the network
accordingly.17 In other words, the addition of a new route linking a new
destination to the hub of an existing airline network will add value not only
to the passengers between the two cities directly linked, but to all the
travelers of the network. Thus, airline networks are a prime example of
what economists call positive technological externalities,18 whereby “an
individual’s actions convey uncompensated benefits to others, outside a
direct market contact” (White, 1999. p. 14).
Notice that airlines are the kind of network-based businesses for which
the value of the network to customers increases not only because there are
more users, but also a substantial portion of that value is derived from size
of the network per se (Coyne & Dye, 1998). That means that diversity
increases the demand for variety and as such adds value to the network.
Such externalities are known as consumption or network externalities. In
addition, as Economides (1996) points out, the key precondition and main
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source for the appearance of this type of externality is the
“complementarity” between the pieces of the network. The value of a
particular segment of the market increases as more of the other segments
are sold. Therefore, there is a positive feedback loop at work here.
Turning our attention to the question of size as such and its effect on
production, it is now widely recognised among air transport economists
that airlines exhibit significant economies of scale and/or economies of
scope and/or economies of density.19 Broadly speaking, economies of scale
exist when the unit cost of production decreases as output increases
(Baumol. Panzer & Wellig, 1982). When these economies are confined to
particular route or city-pair economists speak of economies of density
while if these are a result of adding new product lines or new markets we
refer to it as economies of scope. These economies often find their origin in
the indivisibility of infrastructures and the presence of excess capacity.20
The prime policy concern here is whether the entire network or parts
thereof generate enough traffic to exhaust any economies of scale that may
be present. Otherwise the network may not be able to sustain the presence
of more than one efficient carrier, thus leading to what is also known as
“natural monopoly.”
Furthermore, it is clear that the degree of complementarity, and
therefore the efficiency, of networks is enhanced when the links and nodes
of different carriers are compatible with each other, namely when they use
the same or sufficiently similar technologies and physical apparatus so as to
minimise transaction costs. Notice that “compatibility need not be an all-
or-nothing phenomenon: close technologies may permit transactions to
proceed with some impairment of quality…or at a higher cost.” (White,
1999. p. 10). Of course an obvious way to achieve compatibility of
networks is to define a commonly agreed set of standards that ensure
technological and physical compatibility. The existence of commonly
agreed air navigation standards and practices are of paramount importance
for the orderly and safe development of the international civil aviation
industry. Hence the pivotal role played by ICAO in developing and
promoting International Standards and Recommended Practices (known as
SARPs) and Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) as Annexes to
the Convention on International Civil Aviation.21
The key economic policy concern regarding these features is that, in one
way or another, they constitute the root-causes of market imperfection
inhibiting free competition, thus becoming the justification of government
intervention. Given the dubious track record of governments in the effort of
restoring competition, the fundamental policy dilemma raised here is
whether the potentially negative effects of the resulting monopolies are
sufficiently large to warrant enhanced government intervention.
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Accordingly, the presence of market imperfections does not automatically
justify government intervention. In the end, the choice between unfettered
markets and a continuum of potential government interventions should rest on
empirical experience and observation-guided by theory-and cannot be settled
by pure theory or ideology alone (White, 1999, p. 14).
For Newbery (1997) though the choice is clear. Regulation of
monopolistic (utility) networks has been and still is inherently inefficient.
The way to improved efficiency and, eventually, to lower prices is a
combination of privatisation and liberalization: “…introducing
competition into previously monopolised and regulated network utilities is
the key to achieving the full benefits of privatisation. Privatisation is
necessary but not sufficient” (p. 358). However, the author cautions that the
key problem facing policymakers in their drive towards greater efficiency
in network utilities are the form competition to be introduced and the
choice of appropriate restructuring.
The form of competition is strongly influenced by technology and initial
endowments, and may not be sustainable in every utility, nor in all
circumstances. Economists can play a key role in clarifying the
determinants of successful liberalisation, and the risk of inappropriate
restructuring. Opportunities for restructuring are rare and hard to reverse
(p. 358).
Evidently, the airlines of small states have very limited potential for
exploiting this kind of network externalities individually. This is because,
by definition, their population is small, and therefore their domestic
markets are often insignificant and the size of their route networks are very
limited.
The presence of (positive) network externalities in conjunction with
scale effects has two major implications as far as the airlines of small states
are concerned. The direct policy implication of this attribute is that in a free
market framework the size of the network will be smaller than what is
socially desirable. It is also clear that network externalities also imply that
the size of the network is a key factor
In the case of small states, where routes are thinner, networks less dense,
and the ability of maintaining adequate technical standards uneven, these
market imperfections become even more prominent and pressing.
Furthermore the economic policy dilemma identified in the previous
paragraph is also exasperated by the limited institutional capacity of these
states acting individually. Clearly, if the recommendations of the CSWB
Joint Task Force regarding the need for closer regional co-operation and
increased bilateral and multilateral assistance were implemented, it would
come a long way in alleviating some of these problems.
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Commercial Policy: Regionalism vs Multilateralism?
There is an ongoing lively debate among economists on the merits of
regionalism versus multilateralism. The key question at the centre of the
controversy is whether regional trade integration schemes are “good” or
“bad,” in the sense of promoting or inhibiting, the multilateral trading
system. This question dates back to 1991, with the publication of two
papers, by Bhagwati (1991) and by Krugman (1991). These papers sparked
rich and burgeoning theoretical and empirical literature reviewed in a
recent survey by Winters (1999). He defines regionalism, “loosely as any
policy designed to reduce trade barriers between a subset of countries,
regardless of whether these countries are actually contiguous or even close
to each other” (p. 8); on the other hand, multilateralism, is a behavioural
characteristic of a country relating to two aspects: “(1) the degree to which
discrimination is absent—perhaps the proportion of trade partners that
receives identical treatment; and (2) the extent to which the country’s
trading regime approximates free trade.” (p. 8). Despite the numerous
important contributions in this discussion, it would seem that the jury is still
out on whether regional trade arrangements are “building blocks” or a
“stumbling blocks” toward multilateral trade liberalisation and will remain
so for a while yet. In concluding his survey, Winters (1999) notes that “the
only categorical statement that can be made…is that one incident of
regionalism is not sufficient to undermine a relatively multilateral system
immediately” (p. 41).
First we note that although Sapir (1999) concurs with this assessment,
he correctly points out that analysts often fail to distinguish between
regionalism, as defined above, and regional integration. The latter refers “to
a group of countries that wishes to opt for truly deep integration…with
dismantled barriers to capital and labour mobility and aiming at common
political such as parliament and even uniform foreign policy…,” (p. 51)
which is considered to have unambiguously positive effects. McMillan
(1993) takes a different more pragmatic approach:
Regardless of what economists think of them, RIAs [regional integration
agreements], are here to stay. Regional integration can foster global trade; but
it can also impede it. The relevant issue is not whether RIAs are a good thing
per se, but how to design international laws that ensure that they are structured
so as to avoid harming the global economy…the best test for judging whether
a RIA is harmful is the simplest possible: does the agreement result in less
trade between member countries and outsider countries? (p. 306).
Furthermore, it should also be noted that the discussion on the merits of
the two alternative trade policies has mainly focused on goods trade and
that trade services, as such, have remained largely outside the main thrust
of this particular debate. Indeed, save some isolated exceptions, the
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proliferation of RIA in goods trade in different parts of the world, have not
had any counter part in services trade. Up to this point, there is no
comprehensive regional trade agreement covering services trade in general
between any set countries, except the European Union. In fact, overall
services remain still the most heavily regulated economic activity in all
parts of the world. Furthermore, even economies that have deregulated
large sectors of their domestic services market such as the U.S., the EU, and
Canada, governments remain extremely reluctant when it comes to
liberalizing trade with others countries. This incredulous attitude can, in
great part, be explained by the special nature of services trade, discussed
earlier, but also because negotiations involving services tend to be
notoriously complex, often involving complicated technical elements,
exacerbated by the lack of adequate historical statistical data and reliable
background information.
The paucity of RIA in services trade notwithstanding, the international
civil aviation industry offers a number of remarkable exceptions. In
particular, the successful operation, for several years now, of supra-national
regional airlines such as SAS but also Air Afrique, Air Maghreb, Air Mano
(Abeyratne, 1998), and the recent emergence of several, so-called, “mega
carriers,” would seem to suggest that the potential economic benefits of
greater integration could outweigh the difficulties discussed above.
Reaping the benefits of international cooperation in the field of civil
aviation is also the main driving force behind the emergence and growth of
organizations such as ICAO and IATA.
CHALLENGES FACING THE AIRLINES OF SMALL STATES
Small states face several challenges which are either idiosyncratic to
these states or although encountered in many developed markets take on a
special significance in the context of these states.
Air Transport and Tourism
The fact that many small states are often geographically remote and
isolated from major markets, especially in Africa and the Pacific, has
significant economic and administrative implications. In particular, long
routes coupled with “thin” markets due to limited domestic markets impose
high transportation costs on most of these countries. These conditions
imply that service providers are usually (natural) monopolies and “as a
result, the economies of small states do not benefit from the effects of
competition on improving efficiency, lowering costs, and spurring
innovation” (Abeyratne 1999, p. 7).
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In addition, most small states rely heavily on tourism as the main source
of foreign currency. Indeed, in Table 3, of the CSWB Report (ComSec,
2000, p. 11) it is pointed out that in 1997 the share of tourism in export of
goods and services in the Pacific, ranged from 7.3 percent (Marshall
Islands) to 50.6 percent (Samoa). The situation is more dramatic in the
Caribbean (Table 4, p. 11) where the share of tourism in exports of goods
and services for the same year varied from 43.7 percent (St. Vincent) to
75.6 percent (St. Lucia).
The heavy reliance of the economies of small states on tourism has
considerable developmental and environmental implications. In particular,
as this was pointed out in our earlier discussion on the services trade debate,
the export of services often implies import growth. This is especially true in
the case of tourism development in small states where tourism expansion is
accompanied by significant increases in non-indigenous food imports and
inputs to construction of tourism-related infrastructure. In addition,
linkages and spill-overs to the rest of the domestic economy are generally
thought to be limited, as many types of tourism facilities are in effect
“enclave developments” (ComSec, 2000, p. 11–12).
Nonetheless, the “symbiosis” of aviation and tourism has correctly been
identify as the driving force behind the phenomenal growth of tourism as
the “world’s largest industry” (Abeyratne, 1999, p. 63). Clearly, air
transport plays an especially pivotal role in promoting the tourist industry
of small states, especially in the case of SIDS. The fact that most of the
airlines of small states are also “flag carriers” means that air transport has
had a significant overall strategic economic importance for the
development of these states. However, considering the drive towards
multilateral liberalization of the air transport industry described earlier,
“…it would not be unrealistic to expect that air carriers of the future would
operate air services to tourism-based countries on the dictates of
unpredictable and rapidly changing market forces rather than on sustained
public services considerations” (p. 63).
Furthermore, given the well-established causal link between variations
in National Income and demand for air transport, the high income volatility
that characterises these states, coupled with the openness of these
economies, places carriers in a very precarious financial position. In
addition, the susceptibility of small states to natural disasters and
environmental changes, their limited access to external private capital and
financial resources, and their reduced institution capacity—especially in
the provision of public goods and services (such as airports and ground
facilities)—could transform mere challenges facing their airlines into
major stumbling blocks in their overall economic development. Finally,
while it is true that most of these problems are not small-state-specific, in
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the case of these states they often appear simultaneously, thus having a
cumulative detrimental effect on their economies.
Environment Effects and Airport Congestion
Another serious challenge facing the airlines of many developing
nations, directly related to the earlier point is the environmental impact of
air transportation activity on the economies of many small developing
states.22 Indeed these economies are often confronted with a difficult
dilemma between, on the one hand, maintaining a healthy level of socio-
economic development—to large extent dependent on the hospitality
industry (and in particular travel and tourism), and environmental
protection on the other.
The pivotal consideration in sustainable development is that it has economic,
social and environmental dimensions. Therefore, in considering the extent of
control that needs to be exercised by SIDS [small island developing states] in
the areas of tourism and air transport development in order that a balance be
maintained between progress and sustainable development, all three factors
have to be carefully addressed” (Abeyratne, 1999, pp. 64–5).
In fact, the thrust of the Report of the 1992 United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development (especially Agenda 21), “was that
environmental issues were the necessary corollaries to social process and
should be addressed on the basis of equity, care for nature and natural
resources and development of society. Environmental management is
therefore to effective sustainable development” (p. 58). Clearly, the
geography and geomorphology of these countries imposes sever limitation
and binding constrains on their ability to achieve the necessary level of
sustainable development.
Quality of Service and Fleet Renewal
Recent evidence suggests that the quality of service offered by airlines is
to a large degree determined by the average age of the fleet (Abeyratne,
1998; Headley & Bowen, 1997). Indeed surveys confirm that flight
punctuality, in-flight service, superiority of aircraft, cabin and seating
configurations, and number of accidents regularly top the list of factors
influencing customer satisfaction. Clearly all these elements are directly
related to the quality of the fleet in general and the age of the fleet in
particular.23 It is also generally recognised that the fleets of the airlines of
small (developing) nations are in dire need for major overhaul and that
these countries face increasing difficulties in securing sufficient funding to
undertake this onerous tasks.
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Market Access (Barriers to Entry, Slot Allocation and Airport Competition)
Several studies, in the U.S. and elsewhere,24 have documented that while
deregulation has had an overall positive effect on consumers in the
respective economies, several important impediments to market access
remain, especially for new entrants. In many instances incumbent carriers
use existing exclusive gate use leases in major U.S. and European hubs, the
so called “grandfather rights,” as barriers to entry, which result in heavily
skewed allocation of landing rights, or slots, in their favour. Analysts and
policymakers are concerned that these so-called “operating barriers”
coupled with other marketing strategies, such as code-sharing agreements,
booking incentives for travel agents, proprietary CRS and frequent flier
plans strengthen the incumbents’ positions thus thwarting entry and
significantly limiting competition. “As a result, competition suffers,
leading to higher airfares. The effect of these strategies tends to be the
greatest—and the fares highest—in markets where the dominant carrier’s
position is protected by operating barriers” (GAO, 1996, p. 2).
In the case of small state airlines, the market access problem to large
U.S. and European markets is exacerbated by the relatively small size of the
home market which severely hampers their ability to effectively overcome
these operating barriers. Furthermore, while airports in OECD countries
are increasingly moving towards greater inter-airport competition,
promoting profit-maximising objectives, thus offering incentives for more
efficient allocation of take-off and landing rights, small state airports are
facing a double handicap. In most cases, state ownership of airports
coupled with strong vertical relationships between airports and airlines
means that some form of regulatory control is inevitable (DECD, 1998,
p. 8). In these cases, the OECD recommends, as a second best solution, that
the regulatory arrangement and slot allocation should be based on the
market process in both the primary and secondary markets, subject to
competition law. The problem is that airport administrations in small states
are not always able to perform the administrative allocation effectively.
This is because often there are no primary and/or secondary markets for
slots, meaning that the opportunity cost of slots is zero. This results in
further “hoarding” and the socially inefficient allocation of landing slots.
Labour Productivity and Outsourcing
Greater competition at the global level has forced airlines to make a
sustained effort to control costs, improve efficiency and hopefully increase
profitability. Studies confirm that labour costs still represent a major
component of the operating costs of international airlines and that their
drive towards deregulation has forced companies to reduce labour costs and
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increase productivity (Alamdari, 1998; Antoniou, 1992). One of the most
popular strategies adopted by airlines in order to contain labour costs is by
outsourcing some of their in-house functions (Rutner & Brown, 1999,
p. 23). This reduces their fixed costs relative to their variable costs thus
reducing the breakeven level of output. Evidence suggests that the
functions more likely to be outsourced by airlines include ticket sales and
distribution, aircraft leasing, airport gates, complementary limousine pick-
up, food services, ticketing, baggage handlers, aircraft interior cleaning,
engine overhaul or rework, maintenance training, information systems and
technology, pilot training and advertising.
It is clear that small state airlines have a limited ability to outsource
most, of even some, of these services. This is because small states, and
especially islands, are typically geographically isolated thus making the
entire effort pointless. Furthermore, even when surrounded by other states,
outsourcing to suppliers of services in neighbouring countries will not
necessarily have the desired effect, as costs do not vary significantly on a
sub-regional basis. Nevertheless, considering that there may significant
economies of scale in the provision of these auxiliary services, we can not
exclude the potential that there may be non-negligible benefits to be reaped
from the joint production and distribution of these services, provided that
countries are sufficiently physically close to each other.
Other Impediments
In a discussion of challenges and opportunities facing Asian airlines,
Oum (Findlay, Sein, Singh, 1997) identifies several impediments that these
airlines must face in order to effectively implement market liberalization.
Some of these impediments are also applicable to small state airlines
including, (a) the tendency to “self protectionism” due to restrictive
bilaterals, coupled with small-network-single-hub structures; (b) the weak
consumer influence exacerbated by the fear of competition; (c) the great
variations in the political systems of these countries, associated with the
cross-culture communication difficulties between them; and (d) the
competition between the military and civilian use of their airports.
On the broader issue of the liberalization in international aviation
Trethaway (Findlay et al., 1997) believes that the greatest remaining
impediment is the system of bilateral agreements which, he argues, is both
expensive to administer and inefficient. He believes that as a result of
bilateralism, countries expect to share equally the benefits of freer trade
thus forego mutually beneficial, therefore efficient, trade expanding
agreements.
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ALTERNATIVE POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There is no magic formula to overcome the numerous and often
insuperable problems facing the airlines of small states. Furthermore,
almost every state has its own idiosyncrasies thus making it almost
impossible to produce a ready-made set of remedies that can be applied to
all cases. Nevertheless, the institutional framework outlined in the second
section and the economic characteristics of the international airline
industry identified in the next section point towards two broad policy
options available to small states in order to meet the challenges facing their
airlines. These are the integration of their air transport services at a regional
levels and the liberalization of their air transport markets in a way that will
allow their airlines greater operational flexibility to meet the challenges of
enhanced global competition. Clearly, these are not any different from the
options open to the airlines operating in other states. However, given the
vulnerability of small states to outside shocks, these states need to be
especially careful in formulating an appropriate set of strategies better
suited to their own particular needs.
Several alternative strategies have been suggested that will enhance the
ability of African, Asian, or indeed any other developing country’s, airlines
to survive in a more competitive global market. However, all these
strategies share a common, often undeclared, underlining objective: to
define the appropriate policy environment that will ease the transition to a
more liberal and regionally integrated airline market. The key element of
this approach is the gradual liberalisation of national airline markets over a
relatively protracted transition period, while at the same time setting-up the
foundations for greater cooperation and eventual integration at the regional
level.
At the global intergovernmental level, ICAO recommends to its
members that the airlines of states that “are at a competitive disadvantage
when faced with the mega trends of commercial aviation and market
access” should be granted the following preferential measures (Abeyratne,
1998):
1. The asymmetric liberalization of market access in bilaterals with
developed countries;
2. More flexibility for air carriers in changing capacity between
routes in bilaterals;
3. Trial periods for liberal arrangements for limited periods of time;
4. Gradual introduction of more liberal market access for longer
periods;
5. Use of liberalised arrangements;
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6. Waiver of nationality requirements for ownership of carriers;
7. Allowance for more liberal leasing agreements for modern
carriers;
8. Preferential treatment in slot allocation at airports; and
9. More liberal agreements for ground handling at airports,
conversion of currency at their oversees offices and employment
of foreign personnel with scarce skills.
Other preferential measures could include:
1. Long term low interest loans for the purchase of modern carriers;
2. Temporary exception from emission standards;
3. Collective use of air traffic rights through combined operations;
and
4. Release from obligation to own and control their own airlines.
At the more regional level, Oum (in Findlay et al., 1997) suggests a
number of short and long term initiatives to mitigate the impediments
facing some if these airlines. His short-term recommendations include:
1. Open charter and freight markets between countries in the region;
2. Relax code-sharing rules between regional carriers;
3. Liberalize third and fourth freedom rights;
4. Relax rules on foreign ownership; and
5. Expand bilateral and multilateral agreements with “like-minded”
neighboring countries.
In the longer term, Oum also recommends:
1. Intra-regional open sky agreements;
2. Expanded bilateral and multilateral agreements outside the
region; and
3. The development of multilateral general trade agreement.
Forsyth (in Findlay et al., 1997) has looked at the issue of privatization
of airlines with reference to the Pacific Asian region and has come to a
number of extremely interesting conclusions. In particular he found that, to
a certain degree, the privatization of carriers is incompatible with the
liberalization of markets. Indeed he observed that during the period leading
to and following privatization, governments are unlikely to embark on any
major liberalization campaign that could put to jeopardy the profitability
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and thus the chances of success of privatization. To the contrary,
governments tend to increase protection immediately prior and after
privatization for this very reason. In addition, the author argues that
governments continue to attach great political significance to ownership of
their carrier seen as “flag carriers” to serve the public interest. Of particular
concern to governments is the likelihood that the ownership of the national
carrier could fall in foreign hands. Furthermore, he also found a very strong
positive correlation between per capita income of the country and
privatization of airlines and that the majority of privatized airlines were
large successful companies.
Finally, inspired by the Treaty of Rome, Trethaway (in Findlay et al.,
1997) recommends that the remaining, air transport services i.e. those not
already included in the GATS, should be included in a broader regional
trade liberalization negotiation as part of the wider package of goods and
services. Furthermore the author also suggests that countries interested in
liberalizing their markets should endeavor to document consumer gains
from open-air transport markets, especially for down-stream industries
such as tourism and high tech. A good starting point is air cargo where
potential gains are bound to be large, especially for the rest of the economy,
with almost no “flag-carrier” effects. Lastly, Treatheway is also in favor of
starting the liberalization drive by developing sub-regional agreements of
“like-minded” nations.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we set out to investigate the policy options open to small
states in their quest to modernize and restructure their air transport
industries in the context of the new world trade order. We presented the
main features of the international air transport industry, discussed the
salient points of the analytical debate surrounding the efforts to liberalize
the world aviation industry and analyzed the challenges facing the airlines
of small states. We were then able to propose a number of alternative policy
measures that could constitute the basic elements of air transport policy
aiming at defining the appropriate environment that will ease the gradual
transition to a more flexible, more efficient, and regionally integrate airline
market.
ENDNOTES
1. For the purposes of this study “small states” refers to independent and sovereign
developing nations, which excludes former colonial overseas terrirtories such as Montserrat
and Anguilla, but also countries like Leichtenstein or Faroa.
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2. An important ingredient of any policy is the availability of adequate International Air
Transport data and statistics collection, a point convincingly made by Button (1999).
3. This is the actual title of the actual Report published by the Commonwealth
Secretariat/World Bank Joint Task Force on Small States (2000).
4. “… One’s bargaining power is greater the more one has to offer that the other party
wants (via reciprocal bargaining) and, conversely, the more the other party would be harmed
if one withheld what one has (in retaliation for violation of the agreement.” (McMillan, 1989,
p. 38).
5. It was to mitigate this particular bargaining handicap vis-à-vis that the EU adopted its
own common air transport policy, see later.
6. See Toh (1998), pp. 66–7.
7. It is interesting to note that, ironically, the encirclement strategy also gave these
alternative destinations some potential strategic leverage over the US., as suggested by
McMillan, although there is no evidence that these countries used this (unexpected)
bargaining power.
8. See Antoniou (1998).
9. Implicitly acknowledging this inconsistency in U.S. policy, Toh (1998) concludes:
“But the ultimate goal [italics added] of international Open Skies is the mutual granting the
rights of cabotage, allowing foreign airlines to operate flights serving domestic city pairs.” (p.
69).
10. Weisman (1990) offers a good discussion on the economic issues surrounding
services trade and their application to international aviation.
11. For a full discussion on the economics of the trade in services see Sapir and Winter
(1994).
12. Recall that the MFN is a basic GATT principle, Article I, whereby members are
bound not to discriminate in their trade policy and to provide to all trading partners the same
customs tariff treatment given to the so-called ‘most-favored-nation’.
13. “The problem has centred around two topics: the most-favoured-nation (MFN)
principle and labour mobility. In both instances, the problem relates to a major ambition of
the industrial nations in the services negotiations, namely to obtain not only improved trade
access but also rights of establishment for their services companies in the developing
countries. These countries have been reluctant to commit themselves to granting such rights
in politically sensitive infrastructure activities. As a result, some industrial countries have
sought to deny the application of the MFN principle from the services agreement.” (Supir &
Winter, 1994, p. 296)
14. In particular, this coverage can be found in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Annex on Air
Transport Services. Note also that Article III and V of the GATT also cover air transport. For
details see WTO (1998) and that the Annex is due for review in September 2000.
15. According to some estimates these costs can represent two-thirds of the sale price of
an aircraft (Airbus 300–600) over a 15-year period and that if airlines could reduce
maintenance time (and thus raise rate of use) by one hour per day, this could increase the
turnover per aircraft of between US$ 10 and 12 million per year (WTO, 1998, p. 4).
16. Alternative patterns are also considered in the study, see WTO (1998), pp. 5–10 for
details.
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17. Provided that the system in general and the central node in particular has enough
capacity to accommodate the extra traffic without imposing congestion costs on incumbent
users.
18. Namely, “These are different from pecuniary externalities that are price-related and
are transmitted through the market mechanism.
19. In fact this has not always been the case. For many years the prevailing wisdom was
that airlines are characterized by the absence of any scale effects, see Antoniou (1991) for a
review of the relevant more recent (empirical) literature.
20. On a more technical economic level, Antoniou (1998) argues that indivisibilities
could in fact be one of the reasons why this industry may not have equilibrium so that its core
may be empty.
21. See the ICAO (1994).
22. See Abeyratne (1999) for the a discussion of this problem in the special case on small
island developing states, and idem (2000) for the consequences of slot transactions on airport
congestion and environmental protection, with special reference to the ICAO Airport
Planning Manual.
23. In fact, Antoniou (1992) identified age of the fleet as one of the factors the
determines the profitability of international airlines Furthermore it is also true that the
aircraft noise level is directly related to the age of the flight, see Abeyratne (1998).
24. See in particular, GAO (1996,1998), NRC (1999), DOT (1999), Abeyratne (2000),
OECD (1998).
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AIR CHARTER—THE BUSINESS AIRLINE OF
THE FUTURE …BUT, DOES THE BUSINESS
TRAVELER KNOW?
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ABSTRACT
Historically, FAR Part 121 commercial carriers have provided efficient, economical and safe
air transportation for corporate and business users. Recently, however, corporate and business
travelers find their travel plans disrupted by delays, bankruptcies, poor service, lost baggage,
fare increases, labor strikes and other systemic difficulties that degrade their travel
experience to unsatisfactory levels. This article examines these Part 121 service delivery
problems and, utilizing a tripartite investigative methodology, examines an alternative air
transport mode: FAR Part 135 on-demand charter travel products.
This long extant segment of our national air transportation system is set prime to support
increased demand for charter services. Corporate and business travelers are set prime to
utilize viable, cost effective alternatives to commercial travel products. Two research
questions emerge. First is whether corporate and business travelers are aware of Part 135
travel alternatives. Second is whether Part 135 charter service providers are aware of this
latent demand and are effectively targeting this demand segment in their marketing efforts.
The three-partsurveys employed to investigate these questions examined demand side
Journal of Air Transportation World Wide Vol. 6, No. 2 – 2001
Robert W. Kaps, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Aviation Management at Southern
Illinois University at Carbondale where he teaches in the Aviation Management
Baccalaureate and Public Administration Master’s programs. Prior to joining the Academy,
he spent over twenty-two years in the commercial airline industry in various executive
positions with both Major and National air carriers. Additionally, Dr. Kaps’ has owned and
operated his own travel agency business.
Robin C. Gardner, is a Masters degree student in Public Administration with a concentration
in Aviation Management at Southern Illinois University. Her Bachelor of Arts degree is from
Loyola University Chicago, where she majored in Political Science.
Jeffrey W. Hartung is Vice-President, Research Operations for the Institute of Advance
aviation Management Research, Inc. (IAAMR) located in Carbondale, Illinois. Prior to
joining IAAMR, Mr. Hartung was Director, Airline Program Management at Verizon-
Airfone, formerly GTE Airfone. He has extensive FAR Part 135 experience having once held
the position of Vice-President of Operations at GBAC, Green Bay Wisconsin. In addition, he
has airline experience in route development and marketing from North Central Airlines
©2001, Aviation Institute, University of Nebraska at Omaha
awareness of how to access charter services and examined supply side marketing efforts
targeted at this demand segment.
First, a survey of travel agencies concerning their knowledge of charter products found that
97 percent of those travel agents surveyed were not aware of how to sell or book charter
products. Second, a survey of large and medium businesses regarding their interest in using
charter products found that 84 percent would be interested. Third, a survey of magazine
advertising of charter travel products to determine visibility levels of charter products in print
media found less than one page of charter product advertising in 8,684 pages published in 62
magazines over a 2 month period in Fall 2000. The conclusions derived from the research are
that business and corporate travelers appear willing to examine charter products as
alternatives to commercial products. Travel agencies appear willing to offer and book charter
products for their clients. Finally, charter service providers are not effectively marketing to
this demand segment in print media. The resultant situation is that none of the parties know
how to go about “closing the deal.”
INTRODUCTION
Historically, commercial carriers have provided efficient, economical
and safe transportation services to corporate and business executives.
Recently however, commercial carriers operating under Federal Aviation
Regulation (FAR) Part 121 certification are experiencing poor on-time
arrivals, increasing boarding denials, passenger complaints, congestion
around major hubs and business fare increases (Bowen & Headley, 2000).
According to McCoppin (2000) and Boydston (2000) these factors cause
many corporate travelers to desire better air transport alternatives.
Organizations and individuals seeking alternatives to commercial
service have several options each with different cost structures. The first
option is a personal or corporate aircraft. This alternative offers the greatest
degree of travel flexibility, but requires substantial capital commitment and
is viable only for financially robust organizations. The second is fractional
ownership programs, whereby organizations purchase a percentage of an
aircraft and receive a guaranteed number of hours of use. This alternative
allows many smaller organizations to acquire the benefits of aircraft
ownership at affordable levels. Under fractional ownership programs, the
cost of owning and maintaining the aircraft are dispersed among the several
owners. This alternative has proved exceedingly successful and beneficial
to many firms, yet still requires a capital ownership commitment.
The remaining viable alternative to commercial products is the on-
demand air charter product. Charter services have traditionally held a
small, but stable share of the total U.S. domestic market. In Europe,
however, charter services have accounted for a significant share (56 percent
in 1996) of intra-European air travel (Button, Haynes & Strough, 1998;
Doganis, 1992). One key definitional difference, however, is that associate
the term charter services with operations involving 60-seat or greater jet
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service to major vacation resorts, and the term air taxi services with what
Americans associate with corporate type aircraft. This paper examines only
on-demand charter operations utilizing the corporate jet or turboprop
definition common in the United States.
According to Wells and Chadbourne (1994, p. 26), the primary
advantage of charter operations is flexibility. Wells (p.26) further notes, use
of charter service is attractive to firms that do not have consistently high
levels of demand for point-to-point services. Total or fractional ownership
programs better support consistent high demand for point-to-point
requirements. Charter services are also cost effective solutions when
supplemental or type specific lift is required to support existing flight
operations. Utilization of charter operators providing both aircraft and
crew, operating on flexible client-driven schedules and itineraries provide
lower aggregate time valued costs for multiple traveler scenarios and
represent a viable alternative to the current commercial travel dilemma.
Delivery failure rates by commercial carriers create tension within the
carriers’ prime revenue client base: the business traveler. This traveler base
is increasingly intolerant of commercial service delivery failures. This
growing intolerance creates tremendous demand for viable travel
alternatives. FAR Part 135 charter products represent a robust and
inherently more flexible alternative to commercial product offerings. These
two observations drive several investigative questions. One key question is
what market channels must charter service providers utilize to effectively
reach this traveler base and what should the message be.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study investigated whether changes are occurring in business travel
requirements due to increasing levels of service delivery failures inherent in
commercial product offerings. This study investigated the role charter
products could play in providing alternate travel services thereby
eliminating commercial service delivery problems. Lastly, this study
examined how that knowledge could be delivered. This study was limited in
scope to business travelers and travel agencies in the Midwestern United
States. Specifically the goals were to ascertain whether a market for charter
products exist among business enterprises; whether the traditional travel
distribution channel, travel agencies, have access to and knowledge of
charter product marketing and booking methods; and the extent to which
charter operators use print advertising to penetrate the business travel
market.
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Commercial Carrier Service Delivery Problems
The third quarter of 2000 on-time performance ratings reported in the
U.S. Department of Transportation catalogue Air Travel Consumer Report,
ranked United Airlines tenth with a 51.6 percent on time performance
rating; American Airlines sixth at 75.3 percent; TWA fourth at 78.7
percent; and Delta second at 77.2 percent (2000b). Increased rates of
overbook boarding denials jumped from .89 per 10,000 passengers in 1999
to 1.22 per 10,000 passengers in 2000. The Airline Quality Rating 2000 by
Bowen and Headley (2000) shows net decline in commercial carrier
performance quality in 1999. This occurred in spite of the fact that during
1999 commercial carriers voluntarily created and agreed to an industry
wide performance improvement policy statement containing a plan of
action to improve service delivery performance (Bowen & Headley, 2000).
According to the Air Travel Consumer Report, airline consumer complaints
declined from 2,726 in 1999 to 1,410 in 2000 (Consumer Complaints
Summaries Category, Table 1, p. 37). Bechard (1999) postulates this may
be due to high degrees of self scrutiny by the carriers coupled with
Congressional oversight hearings regarding the enactment of passenger bill
of rights legislation (pp. 27–28).
Commercial carrier customer complaints were exacerbated by increases
in both air-side and land-side airport congestion. According to the U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), highway congestion around large
metropolitan areas in FY 1999 caused an average of 9.2 hours of delay per
person annually (USDOT, 2000a). DOT projects a decrease in delay time in
FY 2001 to only 8.1 hours annually. DOT also predicts that current airport
expansion projects will not have significant impact on airport congestion
until 2006 or 2007. Still, Bowen and Headley believe the high rates of
commercial carrier passenger complaints reflect an overall frustration with
the industry.
Commercial carrier claims of rising fuel prices as a prime driver of fare
increases runs counter to an Air Transportation Association study by Simat,
Helliessen, and Eichner, Inc., 1989 (as cited in Abunassar, Wissam, Koford
& Kenneth, 1994). This study indicated lack of competition as the prime
driver of fare increases. Abunassar et al (1994) concurred with the ATA
report adding both lack of capacity at major hub airports and lack of
competition as prime drivers of fare increases.
Irrespective of which price discrimination model is used to justify
escalating airfares, business travelers absorb a disproportionately high
share of airfare increases. Inability of the business traveler to predict and
schedule trips seven, fourteen, twenty-one days in advance and capture
advance purchase discounts, coupled with the inelastic nature of business
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travel demand allow carriers to price business products at maximum yield.
One example of this maximum yield pricing ability is United Airlines.
Business travelers make up only 9 percent of United Airlines bookings but
generate 45 percent of carrier revenue, according to a United Airlines
spokesperson (McCoppin, 2000). Interestingly, the 1989 Air Transport
Association study, (cited in Abunassar et al., 1994) found high correlation
between the number of business passengers and the size and frequency of
fare increases. Increases in business ticket sales volumes led directly to
increases in fares.
The Airline Quality Rating 2000 report indicates most problems
consumers face with commercial carriers result directly from lack of
competition and airline policy decisions. According to Bowen and
Headley:
These problems range from unfair business practices targeting new start-up
airlines, temporary route structure changes, gate-lock practices, select
incentives to travel agents, ability to tie up landing slots and book them as
assets, rapid expansion of code sharing practices which in effect may reduce
competition on many routes, and flight scheduling competition. (p. 7)
The Charter Alternative
Frustrated by decreasing performance levels and escalating fare levels,
business travelers are seeking alternatives to commercial carrier products
(McCoppin, 2000). Bowen and Headley (2000) conclude that flying a
group of three to six company executives to three to four destinations in the
same day and returning to company headquarters that evening with less
than 14 days notice is cost prohibitive, productivity draining and virtually
impossible to schedule using commercial carrier products. Conversely,
charter products are able to support such multi-destination, multi-traveler
itineraries with relative ease. Charter products, once viewed as executive
perquisites, could become the sine qua non of medium to large businesses
with consistently stable multiple traveler, multiple destination travel
demand requirements.
On-demand charter service is defined as the rental of an aircraft and
flight crew for a specific trip. Charter aircraft range in size from single
engine piston powered aircraft seating two or three passengers up to and
including large transport category aircraft seating thirty or more
passengers. Wells & Chadbourne (1994) define charter services as:
Chartering an airplane is similar to hailing a taxi for a single trip. The charter
operator provides the aircraft, flight crew, fuel, and all other services for each
trip. The party chartering the aircraft pays a fee, usually based on hours flown
or mileage, plus extras such as aircraft waiting time and crew expenses.
Chartering an aircraft is particularly attractive for a firm that does not
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frequently require an airplane or does not often need a supplement to its
existing aircraft fleet.
Chartering can be cost effective for a group of executives traveling together or
for an emergency. When the individual businessperson is traveling alone, the
airlines, including regional carriers, would probably be more cost efficient,
especially if the trip were between two cities well served by scheduled
carrier’s (p. 179).
Charter operations are flown on the traveler’s time schedule and to the
traveler’s desired destination. Charter operators are generally located
among the 5,400 general aviation airports, compared to the 580 airports
served by commercial carriers. These airports are generally less congested
than major hub airports, offer easier land side ingress and egress and can be
considerably closer to the travelers’ ultimate destination. FAR Part 135
governs charter operations and contains functionally equivalent standards
of safety as those imposed upon Part 121 commercial carrier operations.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimates that between
1998–2010 the number of turbine powered business aircraft will increase
about 60.0 percent with an 81.6 percent increase in flight hours (NATA,
2000). According to this report, over that same timeframe 806 general
aviation airports will require runway expansion, runway and taxiway
resurfacing and installation of uprated instrument approach and navigation
systems. These improvements, estimated at $3.3 billion, will be required to
cope safely and efficiently with forecasted increases in the number of
aircraft and the number of flight operations (NATA, 2000).
A recent survey of corporate travel managers, conducted by the U.S.
National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), indicated that 72 percent
of respondents said their companies were using corporate jets or charter
services for non-executive level employees, up from 56 percent last year
(Boydston, 2000). According to Jones (1999), time management, control,
privacy and quality of life issues are some of the main reasons cited in
driving charter utilization to lower levels of the organization. While making
sales calls to corporate executives around the country, a Richmond
machinery distributor explained that charter flights allow him to schedule
an extra sales call each day, where formerly that time was spent in ground
commutes out of and into commercial service airports (Jones 1999). A
senior vice president at the National Business Aviation Association stated
that in the 1980s, corporate jets were viewed as status symbols. Today
charter products are about work productivity, corporate employee time
value and quality of life issues (Boydston, 2000).
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METHODOLOGY
A tripartite investigative approach was employed to obtain information
concerning charter product knowledge levels of (a) end users of charter
products, the business traveler, (b) agents of charter product distribution,
travel coordinators and travel agencies; and (c) charter service provider
marketing efforts in print media directed at these two groups.
First, a literature review was conducted to identify current trends in
commercial, charter and travel agency service levels and to identify any
gating issues. This was accomplished by reference to commercial carrier
quality review information, charter industry publications and governmental
industry publications.
Next, two data collection instruments were constructed for use in a
telephone survey of select potential distribution channel organizations:
travel coordinators and travel agencies and select potential end users, the
business traveler. The intent of the first survey was to determine travel
agency personnel knowledge of charter products. The second survey sought
to determine corporate travel manager and business traveler knowledge of
charter products. Once the surveys were developed, travel agencies and
businesses were contacted by telephone for survey solicitation. Southern
Illinois University at Carbondale (SIUC) graduate students conducted the
telephone survey over a three-day period. Student solicitors were instructed
to record all information. Copies of the questionnaires are contained in
Exhibits 1 and 2.
Due to travel agency managerial requirements imposed by both the
International Association of Travel Agencies Network (IATAN) and the
Airline Reporting Corporation (ARC) only travel agency managers were
asked to respond to survey questions. Travel agency owners were excluded
from participation as well. Travel agency owners may or may not be
qualified as certified travel managers.
The travel agency survey was designed to elicit specific information
concerning knowledge of charter operators, charter operations, product
familiarity, booking methodology and charter commission structure .The
survey was given to full service travel agencies in three major Midwestern
cities: Chicago, St. Louis and Kansas City. Full service travel agencies
were selected due to their handling higher volumes of business requests
compared to agencies catering to leisure or boutique clientele. Thirty-eight
travel agencies of various sizes were selected for interview based on size
and segregated by their annual gross revenues. Agencies were divided into
four categories: small (annual revenues of less than $1 million), medium
(annual revenues of $1 to $5 million), large ($6 to $10 million) and very
large ($11 to $25 million). Travel conglomerates such as Maritz Travel and
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Carson/Wagonlit Travel, with revenues in excess of twenty-five million
dollars per year were not considered. These conglomerate agencies have
preferential volume pricing arrangements with commercial carriers that
would artificially skew survey results. The survey included only agencies
that commission payments under current commercial carrier commission
schedules.
Agencies selected were randomly drawn from listings in Sorkin’s
Business Directory. The number of survey participants in each selected city
was determined by metropolitan size. Thus, Chicago’s target participation
was fifteen agencies of various size; St. Louis, twelve; and Kansas City,
eleven. Agency size classification results were three small agencies,
twenty-one medium sized agencies, twelve large agencies and two very
large agencies.
The second survey was simultaneously delivered to twenty-five medium
to large businesses within the same metropolitan market areas. Businesses
were again randomly selected from Sorkin’s Business Directory on the
basis of gross revenues. The number selected for each city followed the
methodology for travel agency selection. Size determinations were
consistent with North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
definitions for small, medium and large enterprises. Thus, seven selected
businesses were very large corporations; seventeen mediumsized and one a
small firm.
Selection of businesses tracked and coincided with travel agencies
selections in each of the surveyed cities: ten in Chicago, eight in St. Louis
and seven in Kansas City. Like the first survey, Chicago accounted for 40
percent of business participants, St. Louis 32 percent and Kansas City 28
percent. In the large and medium sized participants, questions were
directed to personnel responsible for travel disbursements, generally either
the Vice-President or Director of Finance. The remaining surveys were
directed to either a partner or owner as named in Sorkin’s Business
Directory.
Lastly, this study examined the extent to which charter service providers
were advertising to these target markets in print media focused on upper
management decision-makers. Listings of the top one hundred national
business and finance magazines targeted at corporate decision makers were
obtained from Fortune 500’s online ranking of magazine target audiences
and gross advertising revenues. Morris Library at Southern Illinois
University (Carbondale) and the Aviation Management and Flight
Department Library (Howell) had a combined total of sixty-two magazines
catalogued. These sixty-two magazines were examined over a two month
period in the third quarter of 2000 for charter specific advertising. A partial
listing of magazines identified and the range and breadth of business
sectors targeted is shown in Table 1.
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THE SURVEY
Critical business decisions involving shifts in entrenched purchase
habits, purchase psychology and paradigms require considerably more
justification and support than purchase decisions executed within existing
frameworks. This advanced justification model served as a backdrop for
this survey. This survey focused on defining end user and traditional travel
distribution channel agent knowledge, and perceptions of charter travel
products.
For purposes of consistency all calculated survey percentages have been
rounded to the nearest whole number.
Travel Agency Survey
The first question established a baseline scenario for comparing
commercial and charter travel products. This baseline scenario consisted of
the following hypothetical business trip. Company A needs to send seven
executives from St. Louis, Missouri (STL) to Hartford Connecticut (BDL)
three days from now. The company desires the group to travel together on a
morning departure and, if possible, return to St. Louis the same evening.
Each of the surveyed travel agents consented to providing a commercial
carrier trip quote generated by their computer reservation systems. A
variety of systems were used by travel agencies in developing a quote for
this hypothetical trip including Worldspan Ò , Sabre Ò and Apollo Ò .
Virtually all commercial carrier trip quotes presented by the travel
agencies agreed and resulted in the following: all passengers confirmed full
fare, coach non-restricted space at $1,900 per passenger. The total cost for
seven passengers travelling on a weekday and returning, if possible, the
same evening without at least seven days advance booking is $13,300. The
travel agency commission equaled $350 due to airline commission caps.
Each agency surveyed confirmed the same basic itinerary, timing and price.
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Table 1. Survey Magazine Range
Example of Magazines Included in Survey
Air Traffic Management
Aircraft Economics
Air Finance Journal
Barron's
Black Enterprises
Business Traveler
International
Business Week
Corporate Finance
Entrepreneur
Euromoney
Financial Report Card
Forbes
Global Investor
Global Telecome Business
Green Financial
Hispancic Business
INC.
Institutional Investor
Trade Finance
World Law Business
Plus:
Specific Trade Magazines
e.g.:
Batteries International
International Glass
International Plastics
Petroleum Economist
PharmaBusiness
Total 62 Magazines
124 @ 2 months
Whether or not the travelers would be able to return to St. Louis that same
evening depended solely on what time they would be able to get to the
airport. It is quite possible that the travelers would have to spend the night
in Hartford.
According to Donna Kaps, Manager of Holske Travel Consultants,
recent airline commission reductions have set the upper limit of
commissions payable to travel agencies at 5 percent of net ticket fare
(Personal communication, March 21, 2000). Kaps also indicated airlines
have taken one additional step to reduce commission expenditures by
redefining the upper limit as 5 percent of net ticket fare or a maximum of
$50.00 per ticket. Thus, whether an agency sells a ticket for $5,000.00 or
$1,000.00, the commission earned is capped at $50.00. Net ticket fares
below $1,000 are paid at the 5 percent rate. Thus, in the hypothetical trip
from St. Louis to Hartford, although 5 percent of $13,300.00 is $665.00,
the maximum payable commission is $350.00, or 2.6 percent of net ticket
fare.
For comparison, the SIU Carbondale survey team, using the same
hypothetical itinerary obtained a charter product quote from an online
charter operator, AirCharter.com. The charter quote returned indicated
using a Lear 35 with eight usable seats. The quoted price for the trip
equaled $11,437.00. The quote included estimated flight hours required
from STL to BDL and same day return and all applicable aircraft and crew
wait time charges. Because charter quotes are based on per hour or per mile
usage fees, not on a per seat basis as with commercial carriers, Company A
in this hypothetical can, if it desires, add an eighth traveler or drop
passengers with no impact on the cost of the aircraft. A travel agency
booking this hypothetical trip using a charter service provider would earn
$571.85 in commissions representing five percent of the charter quote. This
hypothetical trip resulted in the following differences between commercial
and charter travel products when booked through travel agencies. The
charter travel product saved the client $1,800.00 in total trip cost, provided
almost double the commission earned by the travel agency and the
hypothetical itinerary was easily completed in one business day. Table 2
demonstrates the comparison.
The above commission comparison is strictly relative to a five percent
commission rate quoted by the airline and charter service provider. Many
travel agencies are compensating for lost commercial commission revenue
by adding in-house service charges to the price of tickets booked. With
reference to the above charter quotation, however, an agency may consider
the price quoted to them as net. In such instance the agency may reap not
only the 5 percent commission rate but also any add-on they desired to
apply. While savings to the traveler will still be present, the agency may
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convert some of the total savings over commercial carriage to their own
benefit.
All respondent travel agencies indicated they are occasionally tasked
with business client requests to book groups of employees’ traveling
together. With the above hypothetical itinerary comparison as a basis, 37
percent of surveyed travel agents indicated they positively would and 13
percent might be willing to discuss booking a charter flight for group
business trips of the nature indicated, although they admitted not knowing
how to go about booking charter products. Thirty-four percent indicated
they would require more information before discussing charter products
with their clients.
Travel agents were then questioned about charter products as alternate
revenue source for the agency. Ninety-two percent stated they would
consider selling charter products if the commissions were equal to, or than,
capped commercial carrier commission structures. The remaining 8
percent were willing to book charter products only if someone would train
agency staff. In essence, 100 percent of the surveyed agencies would sell
charter products if they knew how. Conversely, 97 percent indicated they
had no knowledge of how to inquire about availability or book a charter
product. The remaining 3 percent indicated some level of understanding of
how to determine availability and quote and book charter products. When
further questioned these two managers indicated what knowledge they had
regarding quoting and booking charter products was learned because a
client had asked them about charter flights. Both managers indicated
looking in the yellow pages to locate and then call a local charter service
provider to ask about a charter trip. Practically speaking, no travel agent
surveyed had any functional knowledge of how to book charter products.
When travel agency managers were questioned as to the best method of
obtaining information about charter flights, the results proved enlightening.
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Table 2. Rate Comparison for Booking of Seven Passengers with Itinerary of
St. Louis, Missouri, to Hartford, Connecticut,
Departing on a Tuesday Morning with Return the Same Evening
Commercial Carrier Charter Operation
Booked Through Trans World Airlines Air Charter.Com
Type of Aircraft MD-80 Lear 35
Number of Seats 113 8
Total Cost $13,300 $11,437
Commission to Travel Agency $350.00 $571.85
Capped by Airline @ $50 per psgr.
Net Commission Rate 2.63% 5.0%
Fifty percent indicated they would recommend that their clients contact one
of the commercial carriers for information. Thirteen percent would refer
their clients to the Yellow Pages. The remaining agencies, 37 percent,
indicated they had no idea of where to direct their clients, or how to obtain
any pertinent information. One respondent, after long consideration, said
she knew of someone who owned an airplane and maybe “he would know
how to charter a flight.”
Although these results reinforce the fact that agencies have no
methodology in place for querying, quoting or booking charter products,
more importantly, they have no knowledge of where to look for answers.
Figure 2 graphically highlights this informational dissociation.
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Figure 1. Travel Agent’s Self-proclaimed Knowledge of Charter Booking Procedures
Figure 2. Where Travel Agents Would Seek Advice for Booking a Charter Flight
Travel agents were then asked if a sales consultant representing charter
service providers, local or national, had ever called on their agency, made
any type of presentation, or provided information or literature concerning
charter travel products. Ninety-five percent responded negatively; 5 percent
implied they thought so, but were not absolutely positive. After further
reflection, one agency manager from the Chicago area said she thought
someone might have contacted them, indicating “it was so long ago, I think
it was about flying around the city.”
The responses of all travel agencies to survey questions regarding
charter travel product knowledge and methodologies demonstrated a
consistently significant void of expertise across all locations and agency
sizes.
Business Survey
All businesses surveyed indicated frequent use of commercial carrier
business products, including five participants who owned business aircraft
and managed in-house flight departments. Business participants who did
not have in-house flight departments indicated using commercial carrier
business products exclusively. Eighty-eight percent of participants
indicated a specific individual or department responsible for making all
corporate travel arrangements. Eighteen respondents indicated having
established policies and procedures for booking corporate business trips.
Forty percent acknowledged having groups of four or more staff members
regularly traveling together on commercial carriers.
Seventy-two percent of respondents indicated using travel agencies to
book corporate travel requirements, while 16 percent indicated travel
arrangements managed by an in-house travel manager. Twelve percent of
respondents indicated allowing individual travelers to book their own trip
arrangements.
Charter product awareness was higher among business participants
compared to travel agency participants. Several companies indicated
booking charter products for special occurrences. Twenty-eight percent
indicated they had considered using charter products. Of these, three were
from company’s operating their own business aircraft. In these three cases,
two aircraft were chartered for temporary replacement of company aircraft
down for maintenance. The other respondent indicated a charter flight had
been booked to transport the Board of Directors to a special function. In all
three cases, their flight departments established the bookings.
When queried as to how the company would go about booking charter
travel products, 68 percent indicated they would direct their travel agency
to make any and, all arrangements. Twelve percent indicated they would
either use the Yellow Pages or contact a commercial carrier for advice.
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Twenty percent indicated they would contact their own Chief Pilot for help
with arrangements.
Despite the higher levels of awareness of charter products, 72 percent of
business participants indicated never considering charter products for
corporate travel requirements.
Business participants were asked how far in advance travel requirements
could be predicted. Seventy-two percent reported usually having less than
one week lead-time, while 16 percent reported, usually having two weeks
lead-time.
Business participants were asked to identify reasons for not using
charter products. Reasons cited in rank order were price, safety, lack of
experience, lack of comfort, inconvenient schedules, negative impressions
on stockholders and loss of frequent flyer mileage. The survey team then
asked if cost/benefit analysis demonstrated that charter products could be
competitive with commercial business products would the company re-
examine charter products as alternative travel modes? Eighty-four percent
replied positively, with 8 percent unsure and 8 percent replied negatively.
Of the seven topics cited as reasons for not considering charter products
for corporate travel, one has true validity. The other six, when properly
explained and understood are actually reasons supportive of charter product
utilization.
The first reason cited, price, has validity. However, the price of a charter
product represents only one evaluative factor when properly comparing
charter to commercial travel. The other evaluative factor is time. By
including the value of total time a traveling executive is away from the
company, a very different “true cost” structure emerges. Commercial
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Figure 3. Where Surveyed Business Would Seek Advice on Aircraft Chartering
carrier flight delays, coupled with route structures serving less than 10
percent of available airports require the business traveler to spend
significant amounts of time in ground commutes. Point to point charter
products often place the traveler much closer to the ultimate destination,
resulting in significant timesaving. Meetings sometimes run late. A missed
commercial carrier flight can result in an unnecessary overnight stay.
Charter travel generally arrives and leaves when the client is ready. By
accurately projecting the value of the traveling executive’s time when
combined with the “price” of a charter product; true cost savings can be
captured through use of charter products for as few as two senior level
passengers.
Safety, lack of experience, lack of passenger comfort and inconvenient
schedules were the next most frequently cited reasons for not considering
charter products by survey respondents. Ironically, the last three of these
are in fact prime benefits of using charter products. Charter flights have no
schedule. The aircraft departs when the client is ready, not when the aircraft
operator is ready as with commercial carriers. On-board passenger
amenities and comfort far exceed any commercial travel product. Charter
operations safety and experience requirements mandated by the FAA under
Part 135 are as stringent as those imposed on commercial carriers operating
under FAR Part 121. The fact that these four items are cited as negative
aspects of charter products indicates a lack of deep knowledge and
information regarding the charter business segment.
The sixth reason cited for not considering charter products, negative
impression on stockholders, can again be viewed as a benefit of using
charter products. If a business is functioning properly and rational business
decisions are being made, it is unlikely that a stockholder revolt will occur
because management utilizes charter products in situations that save the
firm time and money.
The seventh reason for not considering charter, loss of frequent flyer
miles, although a potential valid reason for individual travelers to reject
charter products, is incidental to business travel practices. When charter
products are more widely accepted and charter service providers are
effectively engaged in direct competition with commercial carriers, it is not
unreasonable to expect charter frequent flyer programs to emerge.
Magazine Survey
Over a two-month period, in the third quarter of 2000, a total of 8,684
magazine pages contained in sixty-two independent magazines were
scrutinized for charter oriented advertisements. Any page containing at
least one paid commercial advertisement was counted as a page of text.
During this time frame, only one magazine contained an advertisement
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related to any aspect of charter activity. Interestingly, this advertisement
was found in an aviation industry specific publication. The message was
generic in nature, not addressing any advantage or convenience of charter
travel products. This advertisement, less than full page in length, appeared
only once during the two-month period.
Two other aviation-oriented advertisements were found among the
8,684 pages reviewed. One was placed by a commercial carrier and
highlighted the carrier’s schedules and destinations. The second aviation
oriented advertisement was placed by a fractional ownership organization
extolling the virtues and benefits of fractional programs.
Monitoring sixty-two magazines, whose collective readership focus was
senior level decision-makers across a broad spectrum of industries,
revealed one publication containing one advertisement offering generic
charter information. This advertisement was found in a magazine that
specifically targeted aviation industry decision-makers.
But for the existence of one advertisement placed by a well known fixed
base operator, the market channel investigated was void of charter content.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Commercial carriers seek to maximize yield per seat departure.
Business clients are bearing a disproportionately high share of yield
maximization efforts. Inability of most business travelers to predict and
schedule travel in advance permit commercial carriers to price business
products at exceedingly high yield levels, thereby bolstering system and
route yield averages. Business traveler dissatisfaction with commercial
carrier travel products has lead business clients to begin investigating
alternative modes of transport. Charter products can represent fiscally
sound time-weighted alternatives to commercial carrier product offerings.
Escalating business yields and fare structures together with poor quality
ratings represent fundamental systemic problems inherent in the
commercial carrier environment. These systemic problems detrimentally
all passengers, but are most heavily felt by business travelers. These
inherent systemic problems also provide a market entry point for charter
products to compete effectively against commercial carrier products for
business travel revenues. The primary concerns of any business traveler are
time and productivity. Were it not so, business travelers would have long
ago divorced themselves from the predatory pricing practices of
commercial carriers. In fact, many large firms have done just that by
acquiring and operating their own fleet of aircraft. Business travelers not
having access to corporate fleets are beginning to examine charter products
as viable options to commercial travel products. Itinerary flexibility
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coupled with point to point service to vastly greater numbers of airports
frequently closer to the travelers’ ultimate destination are powerful
marketing tools that can be exploited by charter service providers to
capture business travel revenue. Two questions remain. First, are business
travelers, business travel coordinators and travel agencies sufficiently
informed, educated and knowledgeable of charter products and practices to
be able to examine and correctly evaluate charter as an option to
commercial travel? Second, are charter service providers offering sufficient
educational and informational guidance to the business travel market
segment to fill the informational gap and capture market share from
commercial carriers? This study would seem to indicate not.
Businesses surveyed indicated they lacked comprehensive
understanding of the charter marketplace. Businesses surveyed further
indicated that should they desire to examine or purchase charter products as
alternatives to commercial products, they would rely on travel coordinators
and travel agencies to make the arrangements. Travel agencies surveyed
indicated they also lacked comprehensive understanding of the charter
marketplace as alternatives to commercial business products. This survey
demonstrated a massive informational void among business travelers,
travel coordinators and travel agencies regarding viability of and access to
charter products.
For the charter business segment to compete effectively against, and
capture market share from commercial business product offerings, any
charter marketing efforts must be subordinated to charter educational
efforts. Current situational analysis revealed by this survey indicates that all
parties must first fund and engage in programs of informational and
educational exchange before funding and engaging in targeted marketing
programs. Failure to first educate and then market will comply with
Gresham’s law of throwing good money after bad. Business travelers must
be given tools to properly evaluate cost/time comparisons of charter and
commercial travel products. Travel coordinators and travel agencies must
be given tools to access, query, book and track charter products. Charter
service providers must be given tools to effectively interface and integrate
product offerings with existing travel coordinator and travel agency
systems and protocols. Conducting this type of focused mutual educational
bootstrapping will also serve to define appropriate charter product
distribution channels.
Charter Operators, acting individually or as a consortium, or through
several national associations such as NBAA and, NATA can begin the
process by working with local travel agencies. They teach the agency what
charter products are, how they are priced, booked and conducted. The
agency then teaches the charter operator how travel agencies function and
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how client trip requests are managed. Once familiar with each other’s
functional requirements, the agency can then act as field representatives for
the charter operators. There exists strong motivation for the travel agency to
function in this manner. As one Chicago travel agent stated, “We are getting
damn tired of what the commercial carriers are doing to us.” His lament
concerned the fact that commercial carriers are rapidly abandoning once
powerful linkages to travel agencies by cutting commission structures in
favor of alternate direct passenger booking systems. According to Wells
(1996), travel agencies supplied commercial carriers with eighty percent or
more of their bookings. Today direct passenger booking technologies are
rapidly eroding the volume of travel agency bookings and commercial
carrier commission caps are rapidly eroding travel agency revenue streams.
These factors have lead to dissolution of the airline-travel agency marriage.
These factors also suggest the timing is right for the charter operations
business segment to begin courting travel agencies. As was demonstrated
by commission relationships on the St. Louis to Hartford itinerary, travel
agencies see lucrative revenue gains available by entering the charter
market.
The data indicated end users; business travelers are strongly receptive to
obtaining deeper understanding of charter products as 84 percent
responded they would like more information on cost-benefit comparisons
of commercial carrier versus charter products. The data also indicated that
distribution agents, travel agencies, are equally strongly receptive of
obtaining deeper understanding of the charter alternative as 92 percent
responded they would like more information on how to query, offer and
book charter products. It is important to note that at this juncture, this
apparent strong pent-up demand is not for charter products but for charter
product information. Translating this demand for information into demand
for the underlying charter product will involve a paradigm shift away from
long standing business travel purchase patterns and psychology. The ability
of the charter business segment to compete with and glean market share
from commercial carriers is directly correlated to providing and
disseminating sufficient information to allow end users and distribution
agents to justify the paradigm shift.
Dissemination of meaningful and relevant charter product information
to business travelers, travel coordinators and travel agencies can be
accomplished in a variety of ways. Charter operator associations are one
logical starting point. These associations could be called upon to develop
informational programs specifically tailored to travel agencies. These
programs could be administered as short course seminars conducted at key
regional locations and/or presented at travel agency national conventions.
These programs could also be delivered to individual travel agencies by
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local charter operator sales forces. Web based distance learning
technologies could also be employed effectively. A prime benefit of this
association approach would be that all charter service providers would be
presenting the same information in the same format.
Another informational dissemination channel available are charter
marketing portals. Charter portals are organizations that market charter
products directly to the end user and feed charter bookings to an inventory
of charter operators who have contracted to supply lift to the portal. Portals
are a relatively new construct. They function as charter specific travel
agencies who coordinate all aspects of the client’s trip. Inherent in the
charter portal model is the necessity to educate the business traveler to the
benefits of charter products versus airline products. It remains to be seen if
charter portals are able to effectively compete with and glean market share
from commercial carriers, but the educational nature of current portal
marketing efforts is clearly a step in the right direction.
Irrespective of whether either or both of the above options are acted
upon, each charter operator can, and must, call upon local travel agencies
and establish dialogue. Travel agencies can be powerful allies in advancing
charter product sales, but only if they are equipped with the tools and
knowledge to act. Significant growth opportunities exist for the charter
operations business segment. As John Maynard Keynes stated: “All that is
required is a small, a very small amount of clear thinking.”
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Exhibit 1
Telephone Survey Questions
Business Survey
Name of Business: ___________________________________________
City: (Circle One): Chicago St. Louis Kansas City
1. Does your organization either own or operate aircraft for business reasons?
A. Yes B. No
2. Does your organization have its’ own flight department?
A. Yes B. No
3. Is there someone specifically assigned the responsibility of making flight
arrangements for personnel travelling for business purposes?
A. Yes B. No
4. Are personnel travelling for business purposes permitted to make their own
travel arrangements (specifically airline bookings)?
A. Yes B. No
5. Does your organization have a specific policy or procedure that states how
reservations and/or corporate business bookings are to be made?
A. Yes B. No
6. If your personnel are not utilizing a corporate aircraft how are most airline
reservations made?
A. In-House Travel Manager B. Travel Agency C. Direct with Airline
D. Individual Traveler’s Choice D. No Idea E. (Other):_________
7. With regard to business travel, does your organization ever have groups of 4 or
more traveling together on commercial airline flights?
A. Yes B. No C. Don’t Know
How Often?
A. Often (more than once/month B. Occasionally (once a month)
C. Sometimes (once a quarter) D. In-Frequently (rarely)
8. Generally, what is the lead time for booking most of the commercial flights?
A. Less than one week (7 days) B. Two weeks C. More than two weeks
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9. Has your organization ever considered using an on-demand charter operator for
your corporate (business) needs?
A. Yes B. No
10. If you would consider booking a charter, how would you make the
arrangements?
(Record all responses, i.e. Call local FBO, contact airline and etc.)
11. If someone could show you a cost-benefit analysis that indicates chartering an
aircraft may actually save your business money over commercial air travel,
would you be interested?
A. Yes B. No C. Not Sure D. (Other): __________________
12. Based upon your own understanding of the travel market, what in your
estimation would be the most compelling reason to not consider using a charter
aircraft for business purposes?
(INTERVIEWER: Do not give any alternatives, write down only those
reasons given)
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Exhibit 2
Telephone Survey Questions
Travel Agency Survey
Name of Agency: _________________________________________________
City: (Circle One): Chicago St. Louis Kansas City
INTERVIEWER: After explaining the reason for the survey, how they were
selected and determining their willingness to participate, tell them you would like
to give them a hypothetical booking to see how fares and itinerary are developed
with the aid of their computer reservations system.
1. “If time is permitting, could you please give me an itinerary and a fare quote for
the following: I would like a flight that can accommodate seven people, all
travelling together. The origin is St. Louis, Missouri and the destination is
Hartford, Connecticut. They would like to travel on Tuesday morning and
return that same evening from Hartford to St. Louis.”
2. If in the above scenario I would ask you if using an on-demand charter we a
viable alternative, what would you respond?
(record individual answers)
3. What would you consider as the best way to obtain information concerning a
charter flight?
(record individual answers)
4. To your knowledge has the agency ever been called on or approached by a sales
representative or agent representing charter operation/operator?
A. Yes B. No C. Possibly D. (Other): ___________________
5. To your knowledge has the agency ever had a formal presentation made by a
representative or sales representative of a charter operator?
A. Yes B. No C. Possibly D. (Other): ___________________
6. To your knowledge has the agency ever received any literature, pamphlets or
information concerning charter bookings or operations?
A. Yes B. No C. Possibly D. (Other): ___________________
7. To your knowledge has the agency ever sold a charter flight?
A. Yes B. No C. Possibly D. (Other): ___________________
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8. If the commission provided by on-demand charter operators was equal to, or
greater, than that given by the commercial air carriers, would your agency
consider selling the charter product?
A. Yes B. No C. Possibly D. (Other): ___________________
9. In the operation of your travel agency do you have client companies whose
bookings you generate that have groups of employees travelling together for
business purposes? In this regard we are talking of four or more people
travelling on the same itinerary.
A. Yes B. No C. Possibly D. (Other): ___________________
10. From the little we have discussed about the charter business, would you
consider talking to your clients about booking a charter flight over a
commercial carrier?
A. Yes B. No C. Possibly D. (Other): ___________________
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FUTURE OF COLOMBO AIRPORT (CMB) AS
AN AIRLINE HUB
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ABSTRACT
Aviation throughout the world has seen profound changes within the last two decades. Today
more and more airports are looking for hub operations. However, as the success of hub
operation would depend on a number of parameters such as geographic location, route
network, facilities available, passengers’ acceptance etc. not all airports would be able to
operate as successful hubs.
This paper investigates the possibility for the Bandaranayake international airport, Colombo,
Sri Lanka (CMB) to emerge as a hub airport in the South Asian region. It is found that CMB is
situated in a geographically advantageous position in the region with respect to the airline
route network. Comparison of travel distances between CMB and prominent O-D pairs and
evaluation of airline schedules at relevant established hub airports indicates that CMB could
operate as a directional hub serving the South Asian market if the number of destinations with
daily flights could be increased.
INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, air transport was a very small industry. Air travel was
expensive and was restricted to a small segment of the population.
However, in 1999, more than 1.5 billion passengers were carried on
schedule airline services, equivalent to approximately 25 percent of world
population as against an equivalent of 1/2 percent of world population
carried on scheduled carriers in 1945. According to the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO 2000), the world scheduled airline traffic
would increase at an average annual rate of over 5 percent by the year 2002.
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Asia/Pacific region is expected to grow at the highest rate among ICAO
regions.
During the periods where governments exercised tight control and
regulations, authorities had to find means of financing large scale
investments required for the production of new aircraft and modernization
of old fleets due to the growing demand for air travel, improved safety
regulations and pressure for highest environmental controls. This resulted
in the deregulation in airline industry in U.S. in late 1970s. The next wave
of activities that followed the deregulation were part or total privatization of
airlines and airports implementing open-sky policies to allow market forces
to determine the destiny of the national carriers and the aviation industry.
Another development, which took place around the same time,
especially in U.S., is the consolidation of few airports as collection centers
for passengers and cargo. These types of airline route networks have
become increasingly popular around the globe due to the economies
derived by the airlines and airport authorities (Jemiolo & Oster, 1987).
Airports that act as collection centers have benefited by the increased
number of aircraft and passenger movements. Airlines that operated such
schedules have benefited by dominating their presence at one location
thereby creating an effective monopoly and deriving economy of scales by
operating large aircraft. This phenomenon is called hub operation.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the viability of hub operation
in the future at the Bandaranayake International Airport (CMB), Colombo,
Sri Lanka which is located just South of India approximately 7 ° N and 80 °
E (Figure 1). CMB is just 20 km from the capital city Colombo and is the
only International airport serving the Island’s 19 million population.
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Figure 1. Location Map
Sri Lankan (formally Air Lanka) airline is the national flag carrier in
Sri Lanka, which is based at CMB. At present Sri Lankan airline is a partner
of Emirates Airlines and also managed by Emirates officials.
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
Airports world over make huge investments on capacity improvement
and facility upgrading to meet the growth forecasts in passenger and cargo
movements. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and other
leading aircraft manufacturers predict the highest growth indices to emerge
in Asia (ICAO 1995, 2000).
The hub concept is a phenomenon that can be considered on the rise in
the air transportation system outside U.S. In a hub airport, a network of
inbound and out bound flights are conveniently scheduled for efficient
connections without having the need to have direct flights to several
destinations from all regional airports.
In this backdrop, the need to upgrade the air transportation system in Sri
Lanka seems appropriate. However, knowing the limited population of the
country and its leverage on future capacity requirements at CMB, the need
to evaluate other possibilities to benefit from the expected growth is in
order. Management decisions on future strategic direction influences the
infrastructure facilities and their capacities in the future airport. Due to the
nature of the industry and the presence of different stake holders with
varying influences on operations at an airport, such corporate decisions
should be based on careful analysis of viability and its implications on all
stake holders; airport, airlines, passengers, local community and the
government.
HUBBING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
A hub is an airport used by an airline or airlines, passenger and cargo, as
a coordinated point, with several flights arriving in a short time period from
several origins, allowing time for connections, and departing in a short time
period to several destinations. Hub operations expanded mainly because of
the carrier’s need to derive economies of scale by operating larger aircraft
and the need to monopolize its presence at one airport by offering higher
schedule frequencies (Rubin and Jeng, 1993).
Hubs provide passengers with the preferred time of day slot for travel
with increased schedule frequency, which eventually reduce the schedule
delay time. Schedule convenience, is the prime reason for most passengers
to choose between airlines. Airlines in exploiting economy of scale at the
hub airport, offer passengers the convenience of flying in larger more
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efficient aircraft in more comfort (Kanafani & Ghobrial, 1985). Another
convenience for the passengers looking for one stop shopping is the ability
to find most of the preferred destinations within the network of one carrier
which eventually helps to keep the transaction cost to a minimum (Dempsy
& Gesell, 1997). Ghobrial (1991) showed that increased emphasis on
hubbing alone would not guarantee airline profitability unless it is
associated with airline dominance at the main hub used for its operations.
Airport authorities have benefited from the increased traffic at the hub
airport and its potential to reduce dependency on aeronautical revenue as
the main source of income. In Asia, this trend will continue for some time
due to the growing demand for duty-free shopping. But with the increased
emphasis on reducing the turnaround time at hub airports, the future of
commercial revenue expected of franchises, rentals, concessionaires may
not be lucrative. Kanafani & Ghobrial (1985) in studying implications of
hubbing on airport economics, revealed the negative impacts of congestion
at hubs and a potential trend to impose hub penalties such as increasing the
fare and raising breakeven load factors to secure adequate returns on
increased investments required to support hub operations. They have also
given increased congestion as a reason for major hubs to loose
attractiveness and as an opportunity for new hubs to emerge.
METHODOLOGY
The geographic location of Colombo with respect to the possible
catchment area and the established hub airports in the region was studied
based on route lengths between prominent origin-destination pairs. Airline
schedules at established hub airports in the region (Singapore, Changi
[SIN] and Dubai [DXB]) and well established European hub airports that
have direct connections to the study region (London, Heathrow [LHR] and
Amsterdam, Schipol [AMS]) were analyzed in detail to identify
characteristics of schedules of major carriers at their respective hubs. These
were then compared with the present schedule at Colombo (CMB). Data
collected from a questionnaire survey carried out among frequent airport
users were used to identify the passenger preferences at a hub airport and
their attitude towards the facilities available at CMB. Passengers who have
flown at least 3 times during an 18-month period were interviewed with the
help of airline ticket agents.
SCENARIO TODAY
Aircraft sizes changed over the years and will continue to grow as long
as it can bring economy of scale to all stakeholders in air transportation.
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With the present trend to develop mega carriers, the need to have collection
centers to consolidate and collect passengers will continue. The degree of
concentration of airline’s operations at a particular airport will be the
primary indication of hubbing. Any flag carrier will enjoy this status by
concentrating its operations at the country’s international airport and
contribute the primary element in creating a hub. Analysis of airline
schedules at the selected airports clearly shows the basic premise at hub
airports arrivals feed departures. For example, Emirates Airlines’
movements at the Dubai international airport on a Saturday shows how the
departures are scheduled after a set of arrivals (Figure 2). Emirates offers
schedule convenience by limiting the connection time to a maximum of 3 to
4 hours as evident from the hub duration.
When several airlines present at a hub, airlines prefer the prime slot with
many flights to collect more connecting passengers. This eventually results
in severe peaking of facilities and services, which airport authorities would
like to spread over the entire period. Figure 3 indicates an attempt to spread
the demand while maintaining a hub schedule pattern at Singapore Changi
airport. A similar patter can be observed on all seven days of the week.
Analysis of published schedules (Official airline guide) at few major
European, Middle East and Asian hub airports indicate a relatively higher
number of direct destinations offered as compared to less hub networks.
These schedules also show the presence of one strong carrier sharing the
lion’s share of these destinations, which in this case was the country’s flag
carrier. Another factor that indicates successful hubbing is the degree of
schedule convenience. One measurement of this could be the ratio between
the number of destinations with daily frequency to the total number of
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Source: Emirates Airlines Timetable, June/October 1998
Figure 2. Emirates—Movements in Dubai on a Saturday
direct destinations offered at the airport. Another indicator of schedule
convenience is the share of destinations that offer a choice of carriers (more
than three different carriers) out of the total number of destinations offered
at the hub airport. Comparison of airline flight operations between
destinations with direct flights and flight frequencies at the above selected
airports are given in Figures 4 and 5, respectively.
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Figure 4. Flight Operations at Selected Hub Airports
Source: Singapore Airlines Flight Schedule, October 1998.
Figure 3. Singapore Airline Aircraft Movements at Changi Airport on a Sunday
It can be seen that the National carrier dominates schedules at the CMB,
which operates to 30 destinations out of the 36 direct destinations offered.
However, at present only 2 of the 36 destinations offered through CMB
have daily flights. At Schipol (AMS) and Heathrow (LHR), nearly 50
percent of the destinations have daily flights. Close to 10 percent of the
total direct destinations offered have more than 5 flights per day by one
single carrier and approximately 10 percent and 15 percent of the total
destinations are served with three to four different carriers respectively.
Revenue to an airport mainly consists of the aeronautical revenue and
the commercial revenue. Landing, parking and over flying charges for
aircraft are considered as aeronautical revenue of an airport. Commercial
revenue constitutes the moneys received from duty-free, concessionaires,
rental, fuel throughput, airport tax and vehicle parking. With the
development of air transportation and increased emphasis on hubbing, the
historic view of the primary source of airport revenue is changing from
aeronautical to commercial. While hubbing tends to increase the passenger
enplanement at the airport, the best way to gain the full benefit of this trend
should be evaluated, for an inter-regional and intra-regional passenger.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of total revenue among aeronautical and
non-aeronautical (commercial) sources in each region. It can be seen that
the potential to increase the non-aeronautical revenue in the Asian region.
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Figure 5. Flight Frequencies at Selected Hub Airports
COUNTRY’S VIABILITY TO EMERGE AS A HUB
The survey on passenger preferences in selecting a transfer airport was
done to identify what attributes passengers do expect from a hub airport and
on what grounds they are willing to change their transit airport choice.
Since this was done with a predominantly local market there is little
relevance to the viability of hub operations. According to the responses
from passengers who have flown at least 3 times during a 18 months period,
majority preferred a direct route in spite of any offers attached to other
options via a hub airport. If several offers were available to a passenger to
encourage travel through a hub, the priority order of selecting a particular
route is as follows; i) cheaper fare than flying direct, ii) reliable schedules at
the hub airport and iii) one night stay free of charge.
In selecting a transfer airport out of several equal cost options, lowest
transit waiting time appeared to be the first choice. With respect to terminal
attributes of a hub airport, quick and convenient check-in facilities, user-
friendly passenger guidance, clean and tidy buildings and reliable baggage
handling system have been identified as the top requirements of a good
transfer facility.
Runway and Taxiway facilities at CMB have the capacity to handle the
expected aircraft movements for next 15–20 years. There is no restrictions
and night curfew. Hardly any situations where the runway had been closed
due to bad weather. The passenger movements at CMB have increased from
0.15 million in 1972 to 2.65 million in 1999. During the last 10 years the
CMB has recorded annual growths of 10 percent, 6 percent and 13.5
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Figure 6. Airport Revenue as per Region
percent of passenger, aircraft and cargo movements respectively. CMB has
already started the development of its terminal building and the air
navigation system with the help of external funding (AASL, 1997).
Despite the terrorist activities in the northern part of the island Sri Lanka
has shown a healthy and steady increase in country’s economy. This is
evident from the average annual increase of 5–6 percent in Sri Lanka’s
GDP during the last 7 years and steady increase in per capita income
(Central Bank, 1999). The above shows that CMB has a potential to grow
and will be able to accommodate any increase in aircraft traffic in the near
future.
The primary characteristic of a hub airport can be considered as its
geographical location that allows flights from several directions.
According to Dempsy & Gesell (1997), the main direction for business
traffic is from East to West. Accordingly, the biggest comparative
advantage Sri Lanka has over the other established hubs in the region in
terms of its potential to develop and sustain hub operations is its geographic
position in the cross roads between N-E to S-W and S-E to N-W traffic. The
approximate travel distance between prominent O-D pairs through
established and potential hubs in the region shows that CMB is located
closer to the direct route between the O-D’s, specially with respect to N-E
to S-W traffic (Table 1 and Figure 7).
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Table 1. Distances between Selected Hub Airports
Distance (Miles)
Tokyo-Johannesburg Sydney-London
Hub Airport 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Selected Code Leg Leg Total Leg Leg Total
Dubai DXB 4929 3985 8914 7484 3407 10891
Bangkok BKK 2860 5598 8458 4685 5924 10609
Hong Kong HKG 1774 6697 8471 4512 6052 10564
Singapore SIN 3302 5388 8690 3925 6739 10664
Kuala Lumpur KUL 3304 5318 8622 4411 6557 10968
Madras MAA 4000 4427 8427 5673 5106 10779
Bombay BOM 4193 4327 8520 6310 4477 10787
Delhi DEL 3628 5003 8631 6688 4164 10852
Karachi KHI 4307 4380 8687 6841 3930 10771
Colombo CMB 4258 4163 8421 5441 5413 10854
Direct 8420 10562
It can also be shown that Colombo (CMB) and Madras, India (IXM)
more centrally located as a secondary hub in the region with respect to the
airports selected in the Asian region (Table 2). There is the possibility of
Madras (MAA) developing its airports to benefit from their geographical
position. However, the very strong local market in India and the present
marginal level of international traffic originating from MAA, it will not be
necessary for the authority in India seriously look to exploit hubbing at
MAA in the near future.
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Figure 7. Distances through Selected Hub Airports
From the viewpoint of passenger convenience, this positioning offers
another remarkable advantage that most airline passengers prefer. This is
the central location of the country. Most passengers flying in excess of 14-
15 hours prefer a stop halfway to break the journey than to fly for 3 to 4
hours and then to set in for a journey in excess of 12 to13 hours (Hill, 1999).
Figure 7 shows how Colombo is centrally positioned with respect to other
regional airports for traffic from N-E to S-W and S-E to N-W.
CONCLUSIONS
The geographic position of Colombo in the crossroads between N-E
(Japan, Korea) to S-W (South Africa) and S-E (Australia) to N-W (Europe)
is the most favorable comparative advantage it has for viable hub
operations. Other factors include the availability of a strong home based
carrier with a well connected network of destinations, a huge catchment
area in South India and in the South Asian region, and year-round favorable
weather conditions. However, for Colombo to develop as a secondary hub
in the South Asian region, it is necessary to have an increase in flight
frequencies. The number of destinations with daily direct flight should be
increased to maintain viable load factors and to provide attractive schedule
frequencies.
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